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Student writing book
By Steve Dear
Staff Writer
When you read the sports pages these days you have to know
how laws affect athletics, according to senior Brian Sheahan, who
is writing a book to prove his
point.
The book, to be entitled
"American Athletics and the
Law: The Sports Triangle," will
be composed of six chapters totaling more than 300 pages, he
said.
•
In the fall of 1982 the political
science department challenged
Sheahan to do an extensive independent study on the infl uence of Congress and the
courts on athletics, he said.
Sheahan now spends 40 hours
a week in the library doing research and writing, he said. So
farhehaswrittenfourchapters.
The first chapter, Sheahan
said, deals with the fact that
scholarship athletes should be
considered employees of their
universities in part because they
draw large crowd to games and
make more money for their
schools.
Another chapter deals with the

influence politics has on the
Olympics. Governments, Sheahan said, have been using amateur athletes for political purposes.
"Being a former athlete, I don't
like to see athletes used as
pawns in the game of international politics," he said.
A political science major,
Sheahan came to the University
of Richmond on a basketball
scholarship but cannot play on
the team because of a heart problem, he said.
For the past two years, though,
he has been assisting with the
basketball team and is academic
advisor this year. He has maintained a 4.0 GPA throughout his
years at UR, he said.
A third chapter deals with the
lack of equal opportunities for
women in college athletics,
Sheahan said. A 1972 law prohibits discrimination by colleges
against athletes on the basis of
sex. But, he said, colleges still
grant unequal proportions of
athletic scholarships to men and
women.
Professional baseball, another
chapter topic, is the only sport

'
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Brian Sheahan
which is exernpt from antitrust
laws, Sheahan said. Traditionally, baseball has not been regulated by federal laws and because of that it has been exempt.
The players do not complain,
Sheahan said, because they have
been making huge salaries in recent years.
Sheahan plans on finishing the
bookbytheendofthesemester.
But, he said, he will not try to get
it published yet.
He wants to go to law school
and after that he will "polish it
[the book) up" and try to get it
published and use it to get a doctorate. Sheahan said he wants to
be a sports lawyer and represent
teams.
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I am submitting, for your committee's consideration for the first James
Jackson Award for Excellence in Library Research, chapter four of Brian Sheahan's anticipated 300-page plus study on American Athletics and the Law: The
Sports Triangle. The entire manuscript is, of course, available to the committee if so desired; however, I feel chapter four is a representative sample
of the quality of Brian's work and, in particular, exemplifies his broad and
effective employment of library resources. Brian cites and makes use of court
cases, congressional hearings, newspaper editorials, a cross-section of law
and professional journals, and more standard secondary sources. Clearly he
knows how to research a topic.
Brian's overall project has to do with what he calls "The Sports Triangle,"
that is, the interrelationships among competition, legislation, and litigation
when it comes to the regulation of American Athletics. Particular chapters
(other than chapter four) deal with such topics as the relationship of the
scholar athlete to the university (i.e. Employer- employee?), baseball's
peculiar anti-trust status, the positive and negative effects of Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972, the dispute over who possesses broadcasting
rights to college athletic events (i.e. the NCAA or the individual institutions),
etc ..
Needless to say I am most impressed with Brian's work. We've seldom had a
project of this magnitude in Political Science. Also, knowing Jim Jackson as I
did (including his interest in sports), I am sure that he too would be immensely pleased with Brian's accomplishments.
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(1)

INTRODUCTION:

Colleges and universities regularly award scholarships to outstanding young
athletes.
athlete

The standard financial aid agreement between the institution and the
is that in return for the athlete's active participation in the partie-

ular sport, he or she receives free tuition, room, board and books.
In addition to the educational and athletic involvements, the giving of financial aid has numerous implications on the relationship between the college or
university and the athlete.

Foremost among those

implications~

is the potential

legal entanglement under the law of workmen's compensation.
The major questions which are in front of the courts today in conjunction
with such legal entanglements are:

1) whether scholarship athletes are employees

::;.r....

of the institution; 2) whether athletic grant-in-aid, conditioned upon athletic
ability and participation, creates an employment relationship; and 3) whether an
injured scholarship athlete is entitled to receive benefits under the various
states' workmen's compensation acts.
Recently, the supreme court of Indiana was faced with these questions in the
1
case of Fred W. Rensing v Indiana State University Board of Trustees.
Rensing was a scholarship football player at Indiana State University.

On

April 24, 1976 he was taking part in the team's spring practice when he tackled a
teammate during a punt coverage drill.

Upon impact, Rensing suffered a fractural

dislocation of the cervical spine at the level of 4-5 vertebrae.

He was rendered

a quadriplegic as a result of the injury.
On August 22, 1977 Rensing filed a claim for workmen's compensation from the

school's Board of Trustees through the full Industrial Board of Indiana.

His claim

was for recovery for permanent total disability as well as for medical and hospital
expenses incurred due to the injury.

(2)

The Industrial Board rejected the claim on the grounds that an employeremployee relationship did not exist between the athlete and the institution.
a result, the Board ruled

As

that he was not entitled to benefits under Indiana's

Workmen's Compensation Act, Indo Code 22-3-1-1 et. seq.
Rensing then appealed the Industrial Board's decision to the Fourth District
2
Court of Appeals.
That Court reversed the Industrial Board's decision by hol~ing
that a scholarship athlete is indeed an employee protected under Indiana's Workmen's Compensation Act.

Therefore, remedies under the statute are available for

Rensing's injury since it was incurred during participation in football practice.
However, the Supreme Court of Indiana, on February 9, 1983, overruled the lower
Court in finding that a contract of employment did not in fact exist between the
athlete and the institution.
It is the objective of this chapter to determine whether the financial aid
agreement beteen the student-athlete and the institution constitutes an employment
relationship.

If so, is an injured athlete

t~ecefoxe

eligible to receive work-

men's compensation?
In determining these questions, opinions from three related workmen's compensation cases are examined.

Also analyzed are opinions from1

scholarship athletes,

college coaches, university professors, panelists from the "Law and Amateur Sports
II" seminar, related scholarly materials, and the contrasting opinions of the two
Courts in Rensing.

RELATED WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CASES:
As far back as the early 1950's, the notion of college athletes as employees
3

of the university has been argued in the courts.

In University of Denver v Nemeth,

a student-athlete was employed by the University as the manager of its tennis courts.

4
"His continued employment depended on the quality of his performance in football."
Nemeth suffered an injury during spring football practice.

Like Rensing, he

(3)

filed a claim for workmen's compensation.
that he was not on scholarship.

Nemeth differs from Rensing, though, in

Nonetheless, he "had been hired by contract to
5

perform on campus and was required to play football as an incident to that work."
As a result, the court ruled that a contract existed requiring that the University
employ Nemeth as long as he participated on the football team.

In fact, one wit-

ness testified that, "the man who produced in football would get the meals and the
6

job."
Thus, his injury was ruled to have been an incident of his employment "even
7

if perriaps not in the course of employment."

The State Supreme Court, therefore,

affirmed the Industrial Commission award as compensible under the Colorado Workmen's
Compensation Act.
It is important to note that although the student athlete was granted workmen's
compensation, this is not a case involving an employment relationship through the
signing of the familiar grant-in-aid scholarship.

*

*

*

The Colorado Supreme Court once again addressed this issue concerning workmen's
8

compensation in 1957.

State Compensation Insurance Fund v Industrial Commission,

involves the question of whether death benefits should be awarded to the widow of
a scholarship athlete who was fatally injured while participating in a football
game.
A student was induced to give up his part-time job in order to play football
at Ft. Lewis A & M College.

The young athlete consented after the coach arranged

for an athletic scholarship covering his tuition. In addition, another part-time
up
job was liuedAfor the athlete which would not conflict with his participation in
football.
The Colorado State Supreme Court felt that "since the student was already enrolled [at Ft. Lewis], there was no inducement in connection with football either

(4)

9

in the job or for enrollment."

Therefore, his scholarship and part-time job were

not to be regarded as contingent upon his athletic ability or participation on the
football team.
As a result of the Court's contention that no contract existed, the compensation
claim was discharged.

In essence, the Court decided that "since the evidence does

not disclose any contractual obligation to play football, the employer-employee relationship does not exist and there is no contract which supports a claim for comp10
ensation under the [Colorado Worlanen's Compesation Act]."

*

*

*

An athlete was killed in a plane crash while returning with his team from a

regularly scheduled football game.

The question before the Court in this case,(Van
11
Horn v Industrial Accident Commission), was whether the athlete had been an employee
of the college within the meaning of the California Workmen's Compensation Act.
The Court emphasized the fact that, "the coach had told the player that if he
would •.•• [play] football, he would receive $50 dollars each quarter plus rent
12
Therefore, there was a significant relationmoney during the football season."
ship between the athlete's receiving aid for his athletic abilities and participation.

This, in essence, constituted a contract of employment.
As a result, the Court ruled that the widow and children of the deceased ath-

lete were entitled to workmen's compensation death benefits.

In its ruling on be-

half of the athlete's dependents, the Court noted that, "[t]he only inference to be
drawn from the evidence is that the descendant received the 'scholarship' because
of his athletic prowess and participation.

The form of remuneration is immaterial.

A Court will look through form to determine whether consideration has been paid for
13
services."
This decision appears to open a "Pandora's box" for future workmen's compensation cases.

However, the Court carefully limited its decision "to the facts in

question and specifically noted that not all athletes who receive scholarships would

(5)

14
be considered as employees of the donor institutions."

*

*

In comparing these three cases with the Rensing case, one notes obvious differences.

In Nemeth and Van Horn, both received a non-athletic job in return for

his football prowess and participation.

Rensing was given no such benefit.

Like-

wise, Rensing only sought "recovery for permanent total disability as well as medi-

15
cal and hospital expenses incurred due to his injury."

Yet, the State Compensation

Insurance Fund and Van Horn cases involved claims for death benefits.
However, these cases are important to examine because similarities can be drawn
between them and the Rensing case.

As noted by the Fourth District Court of Appeals,

"in all three cases the 'student-athlete' received benefits from a university solely
because of his athletic ability and participation on a football team.

.[Like-

wiseJ, ~,the benefits received by Rensing were conditioned upon his athletic ability
16
and team participation."
Although it is difficult to find a consistent view of the athlete-institution
relationship through these Court decisions, a general rule may be made.

"[A] col-

lege or university athlete will not be considered an employee simply because he or
she is the recipient of an athletic scholarship or grant-in-aid.

Where, however, the

performance of athletic services is the quid pro quo for the scholarship or grantin-aid award, the athlete will be an employee for purposes of workmen's compensation
.
17
coverage."

TWO PERSPECTIVES ON COLLEGE ATHLETICS:
One of the most difficult aspects of sports law, is determining "whether the
relationship between an athlete who receives financial aid and the college or uni18
~J.
What ~ the problem
versity which grants it, is gratuitous or contractuaL 11
of resolving this issue - and the related issue of determining the existence of an

(6)

employer-employee relationship within the bounds of workmen's compensation - is the
lack of a consistent definition of "amateur" athletics.
In the cases already described, the Court has had to decide how "to characterize
the relationship between a student-athlete and the institution that provides him or
19
her with financial support."
This is because "the relationship can be viewed from
20

either of two separate perspectives."
The first perspective is the traditional academic relationship whereby athletics
are merely a part of the institution's educational program.

As a result, the financiaJ

aid which is granted to the student-athlete, is seen solely as a vehicle for defraying
the athlete's cost of an education.
The Supreme Court of Indiana unquestionably took this traditional perspective
in the Rensing case.

In his opinion of the Court, Justice Hunter emphasized that,

"(t]he-_fundamental concerns behind the policies of the NCAA are that intercollegiate
athletics must be maintained as a part of the educational program and studentathletes are integral parts of the institution's student body.
21
financial aid is still first and foremost a student."

An athlete receiving

David Abrams was one of the panelists at the "Law and Amateur Sports II" seminar
sponsored by the Indiana University School of Law.

In the late 1970's, Abrams was

a standout defensive back for the Indiana University football team.

He describes

his relationship with the University from this traditional perspective:
"The University used me for my football playing abilities.
that, and I accepted

tha~.

I looked at it this \vay:

I knew

On the flip side of the coin, however,
If I don't use them equally, then I'm going

to be the one who loses in the deal.

If I don't use every educational

opportunity made available, what started out as a fair and equitable
fcc\\~'(£

agreement ends up being very one-sided in the university's favor."
What is noteworthy about Abrams' remarks, is that he accepted the fact that the
University was going to make the most of his athletic prowess.

Irregardless, he

(7)

was more concerned with taking advantage of the numerous educational opportunities
the University could offer him in return for playing football.
That is the traditional perspective on college athletics - using the athletic
scholarship as a means

~ receiving

*

a college education.

*

*

While the first perspective is the one which educators would most like to see
prevail, there are many critics who see it as being too idealistic.
be refreshing if athletes receiving financial aid were in fact
foremost)

While it would

students~,_first

that is simply not the case in a great many situations.

and

The reason for

this untraditional commentary, is that college athletic departments have become businesses (and in many cases very big and profitable businesses).
The proponents of this "college athletics as a business" perspective, do not
view the athlete-institution relationship as merely using athletic participation as
a vehicle to receiving a "free" education.

Instead, they view it as a contractual

arrangement in which the university receives the benefits of the athlete's talents
in exchange for financial support given to the scholar-athlete.

Therefore, athletics

is not merely a part of the overall educational process.

Rather, college athletics
22
is a part of the overall business activities conducted by the institution.
The Court of Appeals took this perspective in its sympathetic decision for
Rensing.

Presiding Judge Miller made these observations in his opinion for the

Court:
"It is manifest from the record in this case at bar that maintaining
a football team is an important aspect of the Universiy's overall
business or profession of educating students, even if it may not be
said such athletic endeavors themselves are the University's 'principal' occupation.

• • • we believe football competition must prop-

erly be viewed as an aspect of the University's overall occupation."

23

(8)

Ronald J. Waicukauski, Law Professor at the Indiana University School of
Law, also sees the athlete-institution relationship in contractual terms.

He

notes that there are numerous specific terms set forth by the NCAA, a school's
athletic conference, and/or the individual institution.

These terms are defined

24

in such contracts as the tender of financial aid,

25
tent,

and other grant-in-aid documents.

the national letter of in-

As a result, Prof. Waicukauski feels

that, "the implications of all these terms is that there is a contractual agreement between the scholarship athlete and the institution through the financial
aid agreements."
Prof. Waicukauski feels that this contractual relationship is very straightforward.
bound.

He sees it as "an exchange, a transaction upon which both parties are
The exchange is for the services of the athlete for the reciprocal promise

of the University to provide educational services to the athlete."
Even Abrams acknowledges that there is a contractual relationstip within the
business perspective of collegiate athletics.

He recollected on the signing of

his financial aid agreement with Indiana University in this way:
"When I signed the grant-in-aid • • • I felt that I was making a contract with the University.

Basically it went like this:

they made

me an offer to provide me with a college education in return for my
playing football for Indiana."
One of the most significant court cases in this area took place in 1972.

In

26

Taylor v Wake Forest University,

the Court characterized the athlete-institution

relationship in the same perspective as enunciated by Prof. Waicukauski and Abrams.
Taylor quit playing football for the Demon Deacons because of low grades.
Wake Forest responded by revoking his scholarship.

However, the student-athlete

sued the school because the financial aid agreement that he signed was for four
27
The Court for the first time ruled that athletic scholarships are indeed
years.
Nonetheless, the Court denied Taylor's suit because he was not "main28
taining his athle~ic eligibility • • • both physically and scholasticallyo"

contracts.

(9)

Therefore, he was unable to receive damages since he "was not complying with his
29
contractual agreement."
In addition to the contractual rel~tionship within the business perspective,
there are many who feel that college athletics have taken on an overtly professional
perspective.
as

They see university athletic departments as not only businesses, but

profession~!

sports entities.

Allen Sack is a Professor of Sociology at the University of New Haven.

In ad-

clition to his duties as an educator, Sack is Executive Director of the Center for
Athlete's Rights and Education (CARE).
spective in this statement:

He sums up this professional/business per-

"Ninety per cent of the problems that we have in col-

lege sports today are related to the fact that we are imposing an amateur label on
\'l.r-'o-

what is obviously an overt mass commercial entertainment business."
When asked to the respond to the decision of the Supreme Court of Indiana in
the Rensing case, Prof. Sack said, "I see the Rensing decision as a major setback
for athletes' rights."

i'\c~

However, not all courts are unable to break from the traditonal perspective.
In fact, a Minnesota Court in two separate cases, a decade apart, has made these remarks about college ahtletics quite in line with the professional/business perspec30

tive.

In Behagen v Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Representatives,

the

Court observed that:
"In these days when juniors in college are able to suspend their formal
educational training in exchange for multi-million dollar contracts to
turn professional, this Court takes judicial note of the fact that to
many, the chance to display their athletic prowess in college stadiums
and arena throughout the country is more in economic terms than the
31
chance to get a college education."
32
the Court declared that:
Then, in ~ v University of Minnesota,
"The bachelor of arts, while a mark of achievement and distinction, does

--------------------------

---------------------------

(10)

not in and of itself assure the applicant a means of earning a living.
• • •

His basketball career will be little affected by the absence

or presence of a bachelor of arts degree.

This plaintiff has put all

of his 'eggs' into the 'basket' of professional basketballo

The plain-

tiff would suffer a substantial loss if his career objectives were im33
paired."
What is significant about these remarks, although the cases were not involved
with workmen's compensation specifically, is that the Courts are willing to look at
disputes involving collegiate athletes and the institution from the perspective that
participation in intercollegiate athletics has many professional and business oriented
characteristics.

Also of importance

is the fact that the judiciary, like the edu-

cators and sports participants, is split between the two perspectives on college
athletics.
As a result of the two substantially opposing perspectives on college athletics,
it will be up to the courts to settle the disputes.

However, before the judicial

branch can come to grips with this problem, it must decide which perspective it is
to use in order to consistently characterize the relationship between a scholarship
athlete and the university.
of whether an

Only then will the Courts be able to resolve the issue

employer-employee relationship exists between an institution and the

scholarship athlete under the laws of workmen's compensation.

THE GRANTING OF SCHOLARSHIPS AND THE EMPLOYER-EHPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP:
The key question in this area is whether a financial aid agreement between a
student-athlete and an educational institution establishes an employer-employee
relationship.

Such a relationship is required for an injured scholarship athlete

to be eligible to receive benefits under workmen's compensation.
In other words, "workmen's compensation benefits in most jurisdictions are
available to 'employees', so that a claimant must prove that he or she is an em-

(11)

ployee, and not an independent contractor, or person of other status, who is
34

excluded from coverage."

As a result, the Courts are faced with analyzing

whether the injured scholarship athlete proves his or her employment.
In the Rensing case, the analysis of the lower Court was that the athlete
sufficiently proved that he "and the Trustees bargained for an exchange in the
manner of employer and employee of Rensing's football talents for certain schol35
arship benefits."
However, the State Supreme Court overruled the lower Court
on the grounds that, "the appellant shall be considered only as a student-athlete
36
and not as an employee within the meaning of the Horkmen's Compensation Act."
Justice Hunter noted three reasons why an employer-employee relationship
did not exist in the Rensing case:

1) "There was no intent to enter into an

employee-employer relationship at the time the parties entered into the agree-

37
ment."

; 2) "Rensing did not receive 'pay' for playing football at the Univer38
sity within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act."
; 3) "Rensing's

benefits could not be reduced or withdrawn because of his athletic ability or
his contribution to the team's success.

Thus, the ordinary employer's right
39
to discharge on the basis of performance was also missing."
Although the State Supreme Court's decision is persuasively written, there

are many, like Prof. Waicukauski, who feel that "the decision is subject to
some criticism."

Likewise, author Harry M. Cross notes that "even when the

institution takes steps to insure that its academic interests in its studentathletes is not perverted, critics will raise the issue of whether the athlete

40
is not more appropriately regarded as an employee of the school."

It is,

therefore, important to note the critics' rebuttals to the three reasons the
Supreme Court of Indiana denied Rensing his claim for workmen's compensation.

*

*

*

With regard to the intent behind the award of financial aid in college
athletics, the following Court opinion is of note:

"The motivation behind [the]

(12)
aid is • •• at least sometimes, an effort to induce a good athlete to attend
'
41
a particular school in order to be of assistance to the athletic program."
Indeed, many scholarship athletes feel that the University intended for
them to come to their school for the express purpose of assisting their intercollegiate teams much like an employer hires someone to assist in the operation
of their business.

Abrams says that, "the main reason Indiana sought me was for

my football playing abilities.
versity wanted me. 11

I can't think of any other reason why the Uni-

Likewise, Ron Everhart feels that he was recruited to play

basketball at Virginia Tech in a similar manner that corporations recruit possible employees.
merely a game.

He feels that, "at a major college, sports is a business, not
As a result, the players on scholarship are like employees, not

merely student-athletes."
Therefore, it is important to realize that while the University Trustees
and administrators might argue that they do not intend to enter into an employment relationship, the reality of the situation is that the scholarship athletes
often feel that they have indeed entered into one.
can you have a business without employees?

As Prof. Sack puts it, "How

Sure they are student-athletes; but

are they not employees also?"

*

*

*

The second area in which the critics disagree with Justice Hunter's opinion, is the question of "pay."

They feel that the

benefits derived from an

athletic scholarship are similar to other forms of remuneration which are protected under workmen's compensation.
Prof. Haicukauski says that, "the decision based on pay is not fairly reflective of prior decisions which do establish that when you give benefits (and
in this case we are talking about benefits worth $2000- $3000), regardless of
whether you give cash or in some other form such as room, board, tuition and
boo k s • • • that

Constitutes

pay."

(13)

Although the NCAA does not

regard financial aid or any other author-

ized expense as pay, "athletically-related financial aid is viewed by some as
42
mere 'pay', and the recipient, therefore, is an employee."
Everhart feels
that, "I'm getting paid to play basketball with my scholarship.

However, it's

not nearly enough compensation for what scholarship athletes have to go through."
Numerous other scholar-athletes feel the same way, although many do not go
as far as to claim they are being undercompensated.

Andrew Reher, scholarship

basketball player at the University of Richmond, believes that, "I am a professional athlete by virtue of the fact that I am being 'paid' over $8000 a year
(the value of a full scholarship at Richmond) for putting in 25-30 hours a week
on behalf of the Spider basketball program.

In other words, my education is

being 'paid' for while I, at least indirectly, help the school make money off
of the sale of basketball tickets and alumni contributions to the athletic def~b_

partment."
If financial aid is to be viewed as "pay", can it be brought within the
umbrella of benefits protected by workmen's compensation?
Although the State Supreme Court overruled the lower Court's decision in
Rensing, it is important to note the reasoning of the Court of Appeals.

Pre-

siding Judge Miller noted that "any benefit, commonly the subject of pecuniary
compensation, which one, not intending it as a gift, confers on another, who
accepts it, is adequate foundation for a legally i~plied or created promise to
43
Prof. tfuicukauski agrees with this line of reasonrender back its value."
ing.

He says that "for purposes of the Indiana Horkmen's Compensation Laws,

these benefits are almost consistently regarded as pay."

*

*

*

The third reason the Court gave in deciding that an employment relationship did not exist in Rensing, was that the institution did not have the ordinary employer's right to discharge an employee on the basis of poor performance.

(14)
Abrams agrees with the State Supreme Court in this part of the decision.

He

did not see himself completely as being an employee because "the University
could not take away my scholarship for poor performance.

That is simply a key

factor in determining whether a person is an employee."
However, many people associated with college athletics feel quite differently.

Prof. Waicukauski thinks that the Rensing decision "disregards the re-

ality of the relationship established between a student-athlete and an institution."

In agreement is Prof. Sack.

He believes that "athletes are expected to

take on all of the responsibilities of a professional athlete - practice, travel,
adhere to the coach's policies, etc.

If a college athlete refuses to follow the

coach's policies, he is in effect fired."
These men are basing their opinions on the NCAA's practice of renewing financial aid after each year of participation.

Therefore, Prof. Waicukauski does

not think that "there is any question that under NCAA rules, the employer -

44
Indiana State University- could in fact fail to renew for no performance."
Or, as Prof. Sack remarks:
"What if an athlete does not perform up to expectations?
can take away his financial aid.

The coach

The NCAA says, 'No he can't.

They

f&i0.-

can't away his aid for one year.'
hypocr~cies.

I see that as the grossest of

Since they can take away the kid's aid after one year,

J\{t)\ii
that amounts to the school's ability to take the kid's aid."
As Executive Director of CARE, Prof. Sack says he regularly receives calls
from college athletes whose scholarships have been revoked for various reasons.
One student from the University of
because of poor performance.

~Iassachusetts

claimed that he lost his aid

Sack says that the ruling from the athletic com-

mittee stated that, "he was not a basketball player of sufficient caliber to
play intercollegiate basketball for the University of Massachusetts."

Sack,

therefore, contends that "in this case, financial aid was contingent upon ath-

(15)

letic performance.

When the athlete fan~d to meet the employer's expectations,

he was fired."

*

*

*

The Supreme Court of Indiana concluded in Rensing that, "[s]ince at least
three important factors indicative of an employee-employer relationship are
absent in this case, we find it not necessary to consider other factors which
"15
may or may not be present." It is important, however, to briefly mention these
other factors.
John N. Shanks, II, is a member of the Industrial Board of Indiana.

How-

ever, he was not a member of the Industrial Board when it rejected Rensing's
claim for compensation.
colleagues' rejection.

In fact, he believes he would have dissented with his
Irregardless, Shanks reveals that when the Industrial

Board is faced with a claim for compensation, "there are eight areas that we
look to in determining if there is an employment relationship between the parties:
1)

Right to discharge the employee for performance

2)

The mode of payment

3)

Supplying tools and equipment

4)

Belief of the parties in an employer-employee relationship

5)

Control over the means used and the results reached

6)

Length of the employment

7)

Establishment of work boundaries

8)

Needs to a contract, either written or implied"

As noted earlier, Justice Hunter only noted that the first, second and
fourth factors are missing in the Rensing case.
to his reasoning have been noted.

Likewise, logical rebuttals

Therefore, it is important to analyze the

other factors necessary in an employment relationship in order to determine if
in fact scholarship athletes are employees of the institution.
The Fourth District Court of Appeals emphasized that it must "determine

(16)
whether [Rensing's] employment by the Trustees was 'casual and not in the usual
course of the trade, business, occupation or profession of the employer' so as
45o.
to bring it outside the coverage of the statute."
Shanks says that the reason he disagrees with the Industrial Board's decision is that he agrees with the "Court of Appeals decision that the employment
was not a casual employment."

Indeed, the lower Court stated that, "it is ap-

parent that Rensing's employment was not casual, since it clearly was 'periodically regular', although not permanent.

The uncontradicted evidence revealed
46

that for the team members, football is a daily routine for 16 weeks each year."
The opinion further noted the expected participation by scholarship athletes in
daily "off-season" workouts.

In addition, Rensing's participation at all at

Indiana State was the result of Coach Thomas Harp's recruitng him to play for
'v

the school.

"In light of these facts, Rensing's employment by the University
47

was not 'casual'."

Coupling these remarks with the fact that the State Su-

preme Court chose to remain silent on this area, it is safe to conclude that the
sixth factor of employment is met in the athlete-institution relationship.
Prof. Waicukauski discusses another one of the factors in determining an
employment relationship:
"The primary factor, historically, under workmen's compensation law
for determining whether an employment relationship exists, is how
much control does the employer exert over the employee. • •

I think

when you are talking about the relationship between an athlete and
a coach in intercollegiate athletics, there is a 'heck-of-a-lot' of
control."
With regard to the need to a contract, the Trustees all along conceeded that
48
some manner of a contract existed between them and Rensing.
However, they
contend that there was no contract for hire or employment.

Nonetheless, the

lower Court sided with Rensing since the financial aid agreement he signed with

(17)
the school contained the following stipulation:

"In the event that you incur

an injury • • • Indiana State University will ask you to assist in the conduct
49
of the athletic program within the limits of your physical capabilities."
The biggest criticism of the Rensing decision is that many people feel
that the Court should have acknowledged a contract for hire because of the University adding this stipulation to the normal financial aid agreement.

They

contend that since he could have been required to perform services for the athletic department above and beyond normal participation in practices and games,
he was an employee for hire.
What complicates matters is that most institutions' financial aid agreements do not carry such stipulations for extra assistance on behalf of the athletic department.

As a result, many follow the line of reasoning set forth in

State Compensation Insurance Fund v Industrial Commission:

An athletic schol50

arship without further terms does not constitute a contract for hire.
The remaining two conditions of employment - supplying tools and equipment
and establishment of work boundaries - were not addressed by either of the two
Courts in Rensing.

Many feel that these are the two least important of the

eight conditions of employment.

Nonetheless, one can argue that by including

books and athletic equipment in the normal grant-in-aid, that condition is met.
Likewise, one can argue that coaches normally set some types of work

boundart~s-

for tAe players to follow.

*

*

*

In summary, the debate over whether an employment relationship exists in
college athletics as a result of the signing of a financial aid agreement is
far from over.
tle the dispute.

Obviously, it will be the role of the Courts to attempt to setAs was mentioned in the last section, the Courts must first

-

~j

decide which perspective to be used·

in order to consistently characterize

whther an employer-employee relationship exists between a scholarship athlete

(18)

and the institution.

Similarly, the Courts must establish a consistent appli-

cation of the eight factors or conditions in determining whether this employment relationship exists.

Only then will the Courts be able to resolve the issue

of workmeris compensation for injured scholarship athletes.

THE INJURED SCHOLARSHIP ATHLETE AND WORKMEN'S COMP~SATION:
With regard to professional athletics, the Courts have stated that workmen's compensation laws not only apply to industrial accidents, but are "broad

51
enough to include within its coverage employees engaged in athletic business."

52
In Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company of New York v Huhn,

the Court de-

cided that, "the baseball player who was killed [in a car accident on the way
to a game] was a person in the service of another under contract of hire, and
53

therefore was an employee."
The question now before the Courts, then, is whether the financial aid
agreement between the student-athlete and the institution constitutes a contract
for hire within the broad range of accidents and injuries covered under workmen's compensation.

As noted by Cym H. Lowell in The Law of Sports, "the most

complex problem involved in the area of workmen's compensation liability for
athletic injuries, is the extent to which college or university athletes may
54

recover for their participation related injuries."
In analyzing this problem, the Court of Appeals reasoned in Rensing that:
"the central question is not whether our Legislature has specifically
excluded college sports participants from the coverage of the Act,
since it is apparent the Legislature has not expressed such an intention, but rather whether there was a 'written or implied' employment contract within the meaning of the Act which obligated Rensing

55
to play football in return for the scholarship he received."

(19)

As noted, the lower Court decided that there was indeed a contract for
hire between Rensing and the University.

Consequently, that Court remanded the

case back to the Industrial Board for further proceedings to establish the extent
of the benefits he would receive.
However, the Supreme Court of Indiana took jurisdiction and overruled the
Fourth Dictrict Court's decision.

Justice Hunter's emphasized that "Courts in

other jurisdictions have generally found that such individuals as stu'aent-athletes,
student leaders in student government associations, and student resident-hall
assistants are not 'employees' for purpose of workmen's compensation laws unless
they are also employed in a university job in addition to receiving-scholarship
56

benefits."
Nonetheless, the stipulation in Rensing's financial aid agreement with the
University made clear the possibility that if he were ever injured, he would be
asked to perform other jobs for the athletic department.

As Harry Pratter, Di-

rector of the Center for Law and Sports at Indiana University School of Law,
says, "the [Rensing] case is a very sad result.

There was a perfectly clear

reason for including him under workmen's compensation without having to extend
the coverage to all athletes.

Since he could have been required to perform ser-

vices for the athletic department
men's compensation."

he was an employee and entitled to work-

\,\\~

Due to the Rensing decision, it is safe to say that the issue of workmen's
compensation has been resolved in Indiana.

However, as Prof. Waicukauski says,

"there is still a great deal of potential for further litigation in this area."
In fact, there are similar cases pending in Illinois and Florida.
As a result, this question still remains to be answered by the Courts.

Will

the judiciary continue to be relatively inconsistent in its case by case interpretations of the Workmen's Compensation Laws with regard to injured scholarship
athletes?

As Lowell has written, "it cannot be said that the Court's conclusions

-------------------------------------

(20)

57

or reasoning provide a consistent view of the athlete-institution relationship."
Or, will a consistent interpretation of the eight factors or conditions of
employment be applied by the Courts in determining whether an injured scholarship
athlete is eligible for workmen's compensation?

It is the opinion of most that

the Courts are a long way from resolving this issue unless the United States Supreme Court decides to hear a case in this area.
Sheldon F. Steinbach, author of "Workmen's Compensation and the Scholarship
Athlete", sums up this present state of affairs with regard to this issue in the
following statement:
"The schools must eliminate any contractual relationship which provides
for the rewarding or renewal of scholarship aid only so long as the student plays on the team. • • • Should institutions of higher education
persist in retaining a contractual employment relationship with their
scholarship athletes, whereby financial aid is only dispersed as long
as the student is a participating team member, it is only just that
the student is protected and receive the benefits under Workmen's Com58
pensation for any injuries sustained while employed by his school."

IN HY OPINION:
When I was a senior basketball player at DeMatha Catholic High School in
Hyattsville, Maryland, I viewed the world of college athletics from the traditional
persective.

To me, an athletic scholarship was nothing more than a vehicle for

defraying the cost of a college education.

After all, wasn't athletics going to

be just a mere part of my overall educational experience?
Now that I have had the opportunity to participate for the past three years in
a

major college athletic program, I have come to see how naive my original per-

spectives were.

Although the NCAA claims that athletes are students, first and

(21)

foremost, that simply is not the case a vast majority of the time.
for this is simple:

The reason

Intercollegiate athletic programs are big businesses.

While I still view athletics as a means to receiving my degree from the University of Richmond, I can not help but feel that my scholarship represents a
contractual agreement.

In exchange for paying for my education, I am expected

to perform to the fullest of my abilities on behalf of the basketball program at
Richmond.

As a result of this contract, I feel like the University is giving me

over $8000 a year for room, board, tuition and books while I help them in putting
paying customers into the stands and hopefully

~ncrese

their athletic

endowmen~

Likewise, I have grown to believe that when an athlete signs a financial aid
agreement with an institution, the parties take on an employment realtionship.
Therefore, I disagree with the Supreme Court of Indiana's decision in Rensing v
Indiana State University Board of Trustees, supra.
Without a doubt, the University of Richmond recruited me for the express
purpose of helping their basketball team.

Virtually from the first day of prac-

tice, I have felt that I am much more than just a student-athlete on campus.

In

addition, I have felt like an employee of the athletic department which is not only
in the business of producing winning teams, but is in the business of making money.
I also feel that like any other employee, I am being remunerated for my services.

I agree with the statements of Richmond assistant basketball coach Joe

Gallagher:

"An employer-employee relationship does exist between the players and
the college because the school asks the kids to perform in an athletic capacity
in return for an education.
in terms of cold, hard

Now, although the school does not pay the players

cash~they are being paid in the form of a $40,000 edu-

cation for their performance.

To me, that is just like a job.

The only differ-

ence is that the athlete doesn't get his 'pay' in the form of a weekly

cheque."~

Lastly, I feel that scholarship athletes do have to perform up to their

QR-
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employer's expectations or they can have their scholarships revoked.

As Gal-

lagher points out, "Schools have the ability to terminate a player's financial
aid after one year.

In fact, I know of a number of schools who have 'run players·

out' of their programs because they made mistakes in projecting that the players
could participate for them."

fu~

Nonetheless, I think it is important to note that these instances of "running players out" of their programs are infrequent.
coaching philosophy that Gallagher espouses:

Most schools adhere to the

"If the staff makes a mistake in

signing a below adequate player, it is the responsibility of the coaches to live

'IJi:t"

up to their end of the financial agreement."'

Therefore, I wholeheartedly disagree with the three reasons given by Justice
Hunter in denying Rensing workmen's compensation.

Although the NCAA may not label

it this way, the reality of the situation is that college athletes are signed by
I

a school with the intent of helping its athletic program.
"paid" for their participation.

As a result, they are

Finally, they can (although I feel that it is

rare) be "fired" for poor performance.
With regard to workmen's compensation, I believe that the prerequisite contract for hire is established through the financial aid agreeMent •. As a result,
I feel that if an athlete is injured while participating in college athletics,
he should be compensated.
As Abrams says, "the University has the obligation to see that the athlete
is 'made whole' following an injury."

However, Abrams does make the accurate as-

c;ertion that, "usually the parties are able to work out a settlement compensating
the injured athlete."

['lc~

Indeed, from personal experience I can attest to the fact that most of the
time< the employer sees to it that the athlete is fairly compensated without requiring a filing of workmen's compensation.

During my freshman season, I suf-

fered an illness which prevents me from playing intercollegiate basketball.

I

(23)

am fortunate that the University of Richmond, like most schools, paid all of my
medical bills.

In addition, the institution has renewed my scholarship as an

undergraduate assistant coach.

l ~t'w 'Jll\!l~ c~ eX~-~

Nonetheless, not all schools are as ethical.
Shanks.
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As a result, I agree with

When discussing the Rensing decision, he says, "I am not pleased.

has to be an alternative.

-

There

There has to be something to, as I perceive it, take

care of a very tragic situation."

~~

The obvious alternative is to bring scholarship athletes within the bounds
of workmen's compensation.
that the

athlete-in~titution

If the Courts develop a consistent interpretation
relationship does conform to the eight factors of

employment, injured athletes should be assured that they will be compensated.
However, the litigation is not the only area which is involved in the debate over the employment relationship in college athletics and how that applies
to the Laws of Workmen's Compensation.

For as so often happens in the sports tri-

angle which is increasingly enveloping American athletics, the ~egislatures are
making it their business to get involved.
One example of this is the recent bill sponsored by Sen. Ernest Chambers
of Omaha, Nebraska.

He has introduced a bill in the Nebraska Legislature that

would classify University of Nebraska football players as state employees.

Cham-

hers contends that, "the bill merely would legitimize existing 'under-the-table'
incentives (cash, cars, clothes, and special privileges) to perform on the grid59
~~ile this controversial bill will most likely expire in committee, it
iron."
is noteworthy that the legislative branch is attempting to involve itself in
the judicial and administrative problems of collegiate athletics.
The NCAA has also taken action in this area.

"The NCAA Insurance Committee

has developed guidelines for a plan that would provide catastrophic injury insurance for NCAA member-institutions and their student-athletes.

While it should

be noted that such insurance coverage would not constitute an acknowledgement

l
(24)

of any employer-employee relationship", it is noteworthy that the NCAA is responding to public concern and criticism over the handling of such injuries as
incurred by Rensing.
In summary, I want to end this chapter on "Scholarship Athletes and the University:

An

E~loyer-Employee
iJ

Relationship?", with the closing remarks from Allen

Sack's presentation at the "Law and Amateur Sports II" seminar.

He makes a very

persuasive arguement from the perspective that college sports is a business in
which the scholarship athlete is an employee deserving of workmen's compensation:
"When it comes to responsibilities, universities and the Courts do not
hesitate. to define athletes as employees under contract.

Like profes-

sionals, scholarship athletes must sacrifice time, effort and control
over their bodies in return for financial compensation.

In the pro-

cess of meeting their contractual obligations, athletes make themselves
vulnerable to physical and academic abuse.

Unlike professional ath-

letes, however, scholarship athletes are denied a wide range of rights
and protections that are often taken for granted by other American employees.

Therefore, when it comes to responsibilities, Universities

should be made to act like employers.

Yet when it comes to rights,

athletes are magically transformed into rank amateurs.

This is not

only hypocritical, it's dangerous and exploitive.
"There are reasons for workmen's compensation laws in this country.

The reasons are that you are putting yourself into a jeopardized

situation when you go into an employment situation.

Therefore, you

should be protected by some sort of workmen's compensation.
"The financial exploitation that results from workers being defined as amateurs is obvious.

Scholarship athletes help to generate

millions of dollars in revenues for their Universities.

Yet by in-

sisting that these athletes are mere amateurs, the Universities can

(25)
pay a minimum of room, board, tuition and books.

This may be a

shrewd way of cutting costs, but it is exploitive, nonetheless."

(
\\;~
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APPENDIX "A"

BIG TEN CONFERENCE
TENDER OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
1981-82
VOID

f-rom: ________

Date

tNome ol Univo"otyo

0

To:----------------~---~----------------tNome of Appllcontl

Initial

0

Renewal

Dote of Entrance in
University_ _ _ __

!Street Address!

Sport _ _ _ _ __

--- -·-·---

tCify ond Stotet

College Per~od _ _ _ __
I. This Tender is subject to your fulfillment of the admission requirement~ of this University, and its oca·
demic requirements for athletic competition and finonc iol aid.
2. This Tender covers the following as checked:
- - ( a I Full Grant: includes tuition and fees, room and board, and use of necessary books in your selected
course of study.
- - lbl The following items as checked:
- - ( 11 Tuition and fees in your selected course of study
_ _ (21 Boord

__ (31 Room
-

(4} Use of necessary books in your selected course of study

--<51

Other explanation of award:

ACCEPTANCE
I accept this Tender of Financial Assistance. In doing so, I certify that I hove not accepted any other Tender of
Financial Assistance from a Big Ten Conference member at any time.
I understand that:
I will forfeit my athletic elig1bility if I rece1ve any financial assistance from any source other than as
Ia I
provided for in this award, or my family or governmental agencies, or in the form of on award
having nothing whatsoever to do with my athletic abilities or interest~.
(IJ)
Any employment earnings by me during term time and any other financial assistance, except from my
family, but including academic scholarships, must be reported by me to the Conference Commissioner
on forms he will provide. Any such earnings or assistance, in combination with the aid provided
through this Tender, may not exceed NCAA basic educational costs ot my University.
The value of this Tender, together with a BEOG, and any employment earnings or other university adminI cl
istered financial aid, shall not exceed the value of a full Tender plus the permissible miscellaneous
expenses approved by the US Office of Education in administering the BEOG program.
The aid provided in this Tender will be cancelled if I :;ign a profe:;s1onol ~port~ cuntract or accept money
( cJ)
for playing in an athletic contest.
This Tender may not be signed prior to Novcmb'.!r 1, 1980 for basketball, or prior to Feburary 18, 1981
lcl
for football, or prior to March 1, 1981 for all other sports.
After accepting this Tender, I may not thereafter receive from any other Conference member any form
(f)
of financial assistance based upon my athletic ability or through the intervention of athletic interests
without forfeiting my intercollegiate athletic eligibility at the other university.

Signed .. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ·
Student

~-:gncd-- ------Pore-;.,! <:>r Lq)ol Guordool"'

- - - - - - - .. · - - - - - · .

Doto ond Social Security Number
Dote

--j(~~~~ish-t~cccpt thi;'_T-;,-nder .of-~lnancial As~~tance, sign all copies. Kce_p_th_e_o-ri-g-in_o_l-,-op-y_f_o_r_y_o_u_r_f_i_le-!>
nd rdurn the yellow and p1nk cop1cs 1mmedlately upon signature to:
STUDENT'S FILE CCPY
I

~I

APPENDIX "B"

1983 MEN'S NATIONAL LETTER OF INTENT 1983
(Administered by the Collegiate Commissioners Association)

0 FOOTBALL, MID·YEAR JUNIOR COLLEGE TRANSFER: Do not sign prior to 8:00a.m.
December 15, 1982 and no later than January 15, 1983
0 FOOTBALL:
Do not sign prior to 8:00a.m. February 9, 1983 and no later
than May 1, 1983
0 BASKETBALL:
Do not sign prior to 8:00a.m. November 10, 1982 and no later
than November 17, 1982 OR do not sign prior to 8:00 a.m. April
13, 1983 and no later than May 15, 1983
._
0 ALL OTHER SPORTS:
Do not sign prior to 8:00a.m. April13, 1983 and no later than
(Place "X"ln proper bo:r above}
August 1, 1983
Nameofstudent

--------------------~~~~UL~~~~~--~~~--------------------
(Type proper name, includtng middle name or initial)

Address ______________~~~~-------------------------------~~--=-~------------street Number

City, Stale, Zip Code

This is to certify my decision to enroll at
Name of Institution

IMPORTANT· READ CAREFULLY
It is important to read carefully this entire document, including the reverse side, before signing this Let·
ter in triplicate. One copy is to be retained by you and two copies are to be returned to the institution, one
of which will be sent to the appropriate conference commissioner.
1.

By signing this Letter, I understand that if I enroll in another institution participating in the National Letter of
Intent Program, I may not represent that institution in intercollegiate athletic competition until I have been in
residence at that institution for two calendar years and in no case will I be eligible for more than two seasons
of intercollegiate competition in any sport.
However, these restrictions will not apply to me:
(a) If I have not, by the opening day of its classes in the fall of 1983 (or the opening day of its classes of the
winter or spring term of 1983 for a mid-year junior college entrant in the sport of football), met the requirements for admission to the institution named above, its academic requirements for financial aid to
athletes, the NCAA 2.000 GPA requirement, and the junior college transfer rule; or
(b) If I attend the institution named above for at least one academic year; or
(c) If I graduate from junior college after having signed a National Letter of Intent while in high school or dur·
ing my first year in junior college; or
(d) It I have not attended any institution (or attended an institution, including a junior college, which does not
participate in the National Letter of Intent Program) for the next academic year after signing this Letter,
provided my request for the originally specified financial aid for the following fall term is not approved by
the institution with which I signed. In order to receive this waiver, I must file with the appropriate conference commissioner a statement from the Director of Athletics at the institution with which I signed cer·
tifying that such financial aid will not be available to me for the requested fall term; or
(e) If 1 serve on active duty with the armed forces of the United States or on an official church mission for at
least eighteen (18) months; or
(f) If my sport is discontinued by the institution with which I signed this Letter.

2.

1 understand that THIS IS NOT AN AWARD OF FINANCIAL AID. If my enrollment decision is made with the
understanding that 1will receive financial aid, I should have in my possession before signing this Letter a writ·
ten statement from the institution which lists the terms and conditions, including the amount and duration, of
such financial aid.

······-············-----------···-----···---·----······-·····-···--------------···--············-··-··-·-······-.....................................................................................................................................
1certify that I have read all terms and. condi!io~s. on pages 1 ~nd 2, fully unders~and, accept and agree to be bound
by them. (All three copies must be s1gned mdJVJdually for thiS Letter to be valid. Do not use carbons).
SIGN ED

-----------------=s,....ru...,.de-n.,...r- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

SIGNED ------=----:---:-----,-;::--::-----Parent or Legal Guardtan

Dare & Time

Social Securily Number

Date

Trme

Date Issued to Student

Sport

Submission of this Letter has been authorized by:
SIGNED --------~D~,e~cr~or~o7
1A~th~te=r,~cs~---------

. 1.

NATIONAL LETTER OF INTENT
REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES
3.

I MAY SIGN ONLY ONE VALID NATIONAL LETTER OF INTENT. However, if this Letter Is rendered null and
void under item 1 ·(a) on page 1, I remain free to enroll in any institution of my choice where I am admissible
and shall be permitted to sign another Letter in a subsequent signing year.

4. I understand that I have signed this Letter with the Institution and not tor a particular sport.
5. I understand that all participating conferences and institutions (listed below) are obligated to respect my deci·
sion and shall cease to recruit me once I have signed this Letter.
.
6.

If my parent or legal guardian fails to cosign this Letter, it will be invalid. In that event, this Letter may be
reissued.

7. My signature on this Letter nullifies any agreements, oral or otherwise, which would release me from the conditions stated on this Letter.
8. This letter must be signed and dated by the Director of Athletics or his authorized representative before submission to me and my parent or legal guardian for our signatures.
9. I must sign this letter within 14 days after it has been issued to me or it will be invalid. In that event, this letter
may be reissued. (Note: Exception is November 10·17, 1982, signing period for basketball).
10. This Letter must be filed with the appropriate conference by the institution with which I sign within 21 days
after the date of final signature or it will be invalid. In that event, this Letter may be reissued.
11. If I have knowledge that I or my parentllegat guardian have falsified any part of this letter, I understand that I
shall forfeit the first two years of my eligibility at the participating institution in which I enroll as outlined in
item 1.
12. A release procedure shall be provided in the event the student·athlete and the institution mutually agree to
release each other from any obligations of the Letter. A student·athlete receiving a format release shall not be
eligible for practice and competition at the second institution during the first academic year of residence and
shall have no more than three seasons of eligibility remaining. The form must be signed by the studentathlete, his parent or legal guardian, and the Director of Athletics at the institution with which he signed. A
copy of the release must be filed with the conference which processes the Letters of the signing institution.
The following Conferences and Institutions have subscribed to and are cooperating in the National Letter of Intent Plan administered by the Collegiate Commissioners Association:

CONFERENCES
Atlantic Coast
Big East
Big Eight
Big Sky
Big Ten
California Collegiate
Central Intercollegiate
Lone Star

Metropolitan
Mid-American
Mid-Continent
Mid-Eastern
Midwestern City
Missouri Valley
Missouri Intercollegiate
North Central

Ohio Valley
Pacific Coast
Pacific-10
Southeastern
Southern
Southern Intercollegiate
Southland

Southwest
Southwestern
Sun Belt
Trans-America
West Coast
Western
Western Football

INSTITUTIONS
Alabama State
Arkansas-Pine Bluff
Augusta
Baptist
Bellarmine
Boston College
Brooklyn
Campbell
Canisius
Central Florida
Central State (Ohio)
Charleston
Chicago State
Connecticut
Dayton
Delta State
DePaul
Duquesne
East Carolina
Eastern Montana
Fairfield
Ferris State

Florida International
Florida Southern
Fordham
Gannon
George Mason
George Washington
Georgetown
Georgia State
Grand Valley
Hofstra
Indiana State-Evansville
lena
James Madison
Kentucky Wesleyan
Lake Superior
Liberty Baptist
Maine (Orono)
Maris!
Marquette
Miami (Florida)
Michigan Tech
Minnesota-Duluth

New Hampshire
New Orleans
Niagara
Nicholls State
North Carolina-Wilmington
Northern Kentucky
Northern Michigan
Northwood Institute
Notre Dame
Oakland
Pan American
Penn State
Philadelphia Textiles
Pittsburgh
Providence
Randolph-Macon
Rhode Island
Richmond
Robert Morris
Rollins
Rutgers
St. Bonaventure

. 2.

St. Francis (Pa.)
Saint Leo
Slippery Rock
South Carolina
Southeastern Louisiana
Southern Illinois-Edwardsville
Southwestern Louisiana
Stetson
Syracuse
Tampa
Temple
Tennessee State
Texas-San Antonio
Transylvania
Troy State
Utica
Valdosta State
Vermont
Wayne State
West Virginia
William and Mary
Wright State
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INTRODUCTION:
1

In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Act.

In it, restraint

of trade or commerce as well as monopolizing any part of the trade
2

or commerce among the several states was declared illegal.

Twenty-

four years later, Congress passed another major piece of antitrust

3
legislation, the Clayton Act.

It provided a treble damage remedy

and injunctive relief for Sherman Act violations.
Basically, the Sherman and Clayton Acts "prohibit business
competitors from engaging in any activities which would inhibit the
operation of a free enterprise system and consequently impair the

4
nation's overall economic health and stability."

At the time of

their enactment, professional sports were understandably exempt since
their economic impact was quite minimal.

During this period, antitrust

5
laws were best applied to the more highly developed industries.
However, as professional athletics expanded and prospered, the
federal government accordingly applied the antitrust laws to their
activities.

Remarkably, though, baseball has enjoyed the distinction

of being one of the very few major interstate businesses - and the only
professional sport - to be exempt from federal antitrust sanctions.
This chapter analyzes how professional baseball was accorded and
maintains its anomalous antitrust exemption.
is examined from five perspectives:

This distinct status

the judicial creation of the

anomaly; criticisms of the judiciary; Congressional silence; nonjudicial and non-legislative solutions; and baseball's opposing viewpoints.

_ _ _ _ _ _j

I

(35)
While reading this chapter, keep in mind the overall theme
of this book:

the existence of a "sports triangle."

Put simply,

professional baseball has been fundamentally influenced by the
judicial creation of an exemption from federal legislation.

In

addition, the "triangle" has taken on unique dimensions with regard
to the antitrust laws in that the judiciary refuses to judge, the
legislators refuse to legislate, and yet solutions to the problem
have been remedied by those within the sport.
Section 2.1
I.

The Judicial Creation of the Anomaly

Federal Baseball and Toalson

As early as 1914, the judiciary was faced vdth resolving the

6
status of baseball in conjunction with federal antitrust legislation.
However, it was not until 1922 that the Supreme Court agreed to address
7
the issue in the landmark case, Federal Baseball v. National League.
In that case, seven clubs from the Federal League of Baseball
were induced by the National League to join its organization.

How-

ever, the Baltimore baseball club alleged that the National League
had conspired to prevent the formation of a competitive league and
was therefore in violation of the Sherman Acto

It was further argued

that the National League had destroyed the Federal League through its
purchase of the latter's constituent teams.

The plaintiffs felt that

in addition to conspiring to form a monopoly in professional baseball,
the antitrust provisions had been violated since the teams were located

8
among several states.

(36)

Nonetheless, the Court ruled that although "the players were
transported across state lines, this movement was only incidental
to, and not an essential part of, a baseball game which was played
strictly within state boundaries."

9

Instead of defining baseball

in business terms, the Court emphasized that the "exhibitions of
baseball did not engage in interstate commerce for the purposes of
10
the federal antitrust laws."
In his opinion of the Court, Justice Holmes stated that:
"the fact that, in order to give exhibitions,
the League must induce free persons to cross
state lines, and must arrange and pay for
their doing so, is not enough to change the
character of the business • • • ,·_T-~ he exhibition, although made for money, would not be
called trade or commerce in the commonly
11

accepted use of those words."
Since professional baseball was not involved in interstate
commerce, it was therefore deemed exempt from federal antitrust
laws.
In the 20 to 30 years following the unanimous Court's decision
in Federal Baseball, baseball changed significantly.

Its

business

activities not only continued to involve interstate travel, but the
advent of radio and television broadcasts carried the "exhibitions"
all over the country.

(37)

The first notable challenge to the Court's reasoning in
12

Federal Baseball occurred in 1949.

In Gardella v. Chandler,

a three-judge panel was split over the antitrust issue.

"Judges

Learned Hand and Jerome Frank agreed that in view of the expanded
concept of interstate commerce and the growth of organized baseball,
the antitrust immunity conferred to Federal Baseball was perhaps no
13
longer valid."
Judge Frank concluded that:
"This court cannot, of course, tell the
Supreme Court that it was once wrong.

But

one should not wait for formal retraction

14
in the face of charges plaining foreshadowed."
An out of court settlement prevented Gardella from advancing
to the Supreme Court.

It was not until 1953 that another case

challenging baseball's antitrust exemption reached the highest
court.
In Toalson v. New York Yankees, Inc. and its two companion
15
cases, "several baseball players challenged the reserve system
alleging damage by the unlawful control of their freedom to participate

16
as players."

17
The Court, in a per curiam decision , affirmed the

lower court's decision upholding Federal Baseball since, "the business
of providing public baseball games for profit

• was not within

18
the scope of federal antitrust laws."
Of equal importance is the judiciary's deference to legislative
remedies for the exemption:
"Congress has had the rulir..g under consideration but has not seen fit to bring such
business under these laws by legislation

(38)

having prospective effect.

The business

has thus been left for thirty years to
develop, on the understanding that it was
not subject to existing antitrust legislation.
The present cases ask us to overrule the prior
decision and, with retrospective effect, hold
the legislation applicable.

We think that if

there are evils in this field which now
warrant application to it of the antitrust
19
laws it should be by legislation."
By relying solely on Federal Baseball and Congressional silence,

the Supreme Court issued their ruling "without re-examination of the
20
underlying issues" of the case.
Many scholars are critical of
this because unlike Federal Baseball, "Toalson did not hold as is
commonly thought that in 1953 baseball was still not to be considered
21
This in fact was pronounced two years later
trade or commerce".
22
in United States v. Shubert.
Nonetheless, the Court refused to rule
23
(in Toalson) on the alleged illegality of baseball's "reserve clause"
until 1972.
II.

Antitrust and other professional soorts

It was not until the late 1950's that baseball's exemption began
to take on its anomalous characteristic.

On the same day that it

decided Shubert, the Court rejected the claim by the International

24

Boxing Club that Toalson should apply to all professional sports.

(39)
Of greater significance is the 1957 case, Radovich v.
25
National Football League.
In the late 1940's, Radovich played
for the Detroit Lions of the N.F.L.

He broke his contract with

the Lions in order to play in the upstart All-American Conference.
As a result, the NFL declared him ineligible.

Years later, he was

turned down when he applied for the job as coach of the San Francisco
Clippers of the Pacific Coast League because it was an affiliate
of the NFL.

Radovich sued for treble damages alleging that the

NFL was in violation of federal antitrust laws.
The Supreme Court formalized the anomaly by deciding that,
"Since Toalson and Federal Baseball are still
cited as controlling authority in the antitrust
actions involving other fields of business, we
now specifically limit the rule there established
to the facts there involved, i.e., the business
of professional baseball.

As long as Congress

continues to acquiesce, we should adhere to but not extend - the interpretation of the Act

26
made in those cases."
The Court then acknowledged the inconsistency of this ruling
and admitted that:
"Were we considering the question of baseball
for the first time upon a clean slate we would
have no doubts.

But • • • the orderly way to

eliminate error or distinction, if any there be,
27
is by legislation and not by court decision."

______ j

(L.o)

As a result, the Sherman Act is applicable to football while
"the repercussions of overruling precedent precluded (the Court)

28
from correcting its past errors" with regard to baseball.
In addition to being denied an antitrust exemption, the NFL
saw its version of the reserve clause, the "Rozelle Rule", invalidated by the judiciary in the mid-1970's.

First in Kaop v.

29
National Football League, and finally in Mackey v. National
30
Football League , the courts held that "the practices under the Rozelle
Rule • • •

are

an unreasonable restraint of trade and therefore

31
a violation of the antitrust prohibition."

Judge Larson's decision

in Mackey "amounted to an emphatic rejection of the traditional

32
justifications for player restraints."
The contractual devices used to control player movement between
member clubs was also invalidated on antitrust grounds in professional

33
basketball

34
and professional hockey

35
sports like golf

in the 1970's.

Even individual

36
and bowling

the Sherman and Clayton Acts.

have been brought under the purview of
In sum, "it is clear that other types

of sports and entertainment will not be allowed to share baseball's
37
special status."
III.

Flood:

The anomaly continues

Professional baseball's antitrust exemption was once again
attacked in the early 1970's. In Salerno v. American League of
38
Professional Baseball Clubs , the second circuit court ruled against
two umpires who alleged to have been discharged because of their
attempts to organize American League umpires for the purpose of

(41)
collective bargaining.

By declining to overrule Federal Baseball

and Toalson, "the judiciary once again diminished the likelihood of
39
success in a lower court challenge to the baseball exemption."
However, the lower court issued a terse commentary on the Supreme
Court's holdings:
"We freely acknowledge our belief that
Federal Baseball was not one of Mr. Justice
Holmes' happiest days, that the rationale of
Toalson is extremely dubious and that, to use
the Supreme Court's own adjectives, the
distinction between baseball and other professional sports is 'unrealistic,' 'inconsistent'
and 'illogical' • • • However, we continue to
believe that the Supreme Court should retain
the exclusive privilege of overruling its own
decisions, save perhaps ¥hen opinions already
delivered have created a near certainty that only
the occasion is needed for pronouncement of the
doom.

While we should not fall out of our chairs

with surprise at the news that Federal Baseball
and Toalson has been overruled, we are not at
all certain the Court is ready to give them a
happy dispatch."
The Supreme Court agreed to hear for the third, and possibly
last, time a case calling for the removal of baseball's antitrust

(42)
41
exemption in Flood v. Kuhn.
In 1969, the St. Louis Cardinals traded their co-captain and
star center fielder, Curt Flood, to the Philadelphia Phillies.

How-

ever, "Flood did something that transformed him immediately from
just another big league baseball player into a crusader, a radical,

42
a reformer.

He refused to go."

Flood was appalled that he was traded without ever being
consulted or given an opportunity to express his opinion on the
matter.

He even wrote a letter to Commissioner Bowie Kuhn claiming

that he had a right to negotiate a contract with other clubs.

In that

letter, he stated that:
"after twelve years in the Major Leagues, I do
not feel that I am a piece of property to be
bought and sold irrespective of my wishes.

I

believe that any system which produces that
result violates my basic right as a citizen
and is inconsistent with the laws of the
43
United States."
Flood then filed suit claiming that baseball's reserve system
was a direct violation of the Sherman Act.

In the petitioner's brief,

the reserve system is depicted as:
"the scheme which binds every American professional
baseball player to one team, and which compels
team owners, whether competitors or not, to boycott the player property of another team owner and to boycott any fellow owner to eliminate
competition in the recruitment and retention
of personnel.

"44

(43)

45
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in a 5-3 decision

ruled that

it was up to Congress to eliminate baseball's anomalous exemption,

46
thereby reaffirming Federal Baseball and Toalson.

Specifically,

Justice Blackmun noted that, "(s)ince Toalson more than 50 bills
have been introduced into Congress relative to the applicability or

47
nonapplicability of the antitrust laws to baseball."
none of these bills have passed both houses.

However,

Therefore,

"the Court concluded that it was not dispositive
that Congress had failed to act, for they had
'acted', in the Court's view, with no intention
to subject baseball's reserve system to the

48
reach of its antitrust statutes."
As noted, the Court believed that Congress had no intention
of subjecting baseball and its reserve system to federal antitrust
laws.

Of equal importance was the majority's contention that the

legislators were better suited to handle the problems of eliminating
a 50 year aberration.

This was summed up by Justice Blackmun:

"The Court has expressed concern about the
confusion and the retroactivity problems
that inevitably would result vdth a judicial
overturning of Federal Baseball.

It has voiced

a preference that if any change is to be made,
it come by legislative action that, by its

49
nature, is only prospective in operation."

(44)

There is another important reason why the Justices failed to
eliminate what even they admitted to be an "anomaly 11 and an
50
"aberration".
This is the Court's rigid adherence to stare decisis.
Simply put, courts traditionally "refuse to overrule prior statutory

51
interpretations."

Often times, the judiciary feels that by not

following precedent, they overstep their judicial powers by impinging
upon the legislative branch.

"If the legislature disagrees with the

initial interpretation, the argument runs, then it has the sole
52
mandate to change the law by amending the statute."
Thus, the Supreme Court was compelled to acknowledge that even
though "professional baseball is a business and it is engaged in

53
interstate commerce,"

it is still "deemed fully entitled to the
54
benefit of stare decisis."
Many scholars feel that Flood closes the door on future litigation
with regard to baseball's antitrust exemption.

As Nancy Jean l1eissner

notes, Flood "makes it expressly clear that baseball's reserve
55
system is not subject to antitrust attack in the courts."
In fact,
"future plaintiffs would, thusly, not be well advised to return to the
judicial system armed with only a bat and the Sherman Act to do battle
56
with baseball's antitrust exemption."
However, there are other scholars that feel that "the latest
Supreme Court pronouncement is not likely to be the last word regard57
ing one of the last vestages of human bondage in the United States."
In addition, there are numerous other aspects of this uniquely protected
sport which may in fact be subjected to litigation.

"Antitrust issues

_____ j

(45)

might arise in connection with the movement of franchises, denial
of franchises to interested investors or their cities, league or
club control of stadiums, and intrusion by established clubs on

58
newly formed leagues."

It is also feasible that the various

types of league and club contracts pertaining to such business
aspects as television, radio and concession revenues will fall
within the purview of the antitrust laws.
In other words, the Supreme Court has granted baseball an
anomalous antitrust exemption through its repeated adherence to
the Federal Baseball decision and its deference to Congress to
settle this issue.

However, it seems unlikely that either the

judicial or legislative branches of government "intended that
every activity connected with baseball, no matter how tangential,
59
enjoys the protection of the immunity umbrella."
Section 2.2
I.

Criticisms of the Judiciary

Dissenting Opinions of Supreme Court Justices

Criticism of the judiciary's handling of baseball's antitrust exemption is widespread.

Newspapers, periodicals, and

scholarly journals continually chastise the judicial branch for
creating and upholding this anomaly on the basis of stare decisis
and deference to Congress.

More importantly, there are those

within the judiciary who also disagree with the Supreme Court.
As a result, this analysis of the criticisms of the judiciary
begins with an examination of the opinions of the dissenting

(46)

justices in Toalson and Flood.
Justice Burton, with whom Justice Reed concurred, wrote
the dissenting opinion in Toalson.
11

His main contention was that:

it is a contradiction in terms to say that
the defendants in the cases before us are
not now engaged in interstate trade or commerce
as those terms are used in the Constitution
6o

of the United States and the Sherman Act. 11
He cited such interstate business activities as traveling between
the states, purchasing materials in interstate commerce, radio
and television broadcasts beyond state lines, and baseball's

61
farm system which involves member teams in various states.

He also noted that in 1922, baseball was not involved in
much interstate commerce and therefore he does not disagree with
the Supreme Court's rationale at that time.

However, Justice

Burton emphasizes that:
11

in the Federal Baseball Club case the Court
did not state that even if the activities of
organized baseball amounted to interstate
trade or commerce those activities were exempt
from the Sherman Act.

11

62

In fact, Justice Holmes, the writer of the Court's opinion in
Federal Baseball, made this clear in an opinion written a year
after that landmark antitrust case.

He said that, "it may be

that what in general is incidental, in some instances

~ay

rise

to a magnitude that requires it to be considered independently"

(47)

63
in order to determine its legality within the Sherman Act.
Justice Burton also gives weight to the fact that the judiciary,
and not Congress, is responsible for baseball's antitrust exemption.
As a result, he dissents from the majority for the primary reason
that professional baseball is involved in "interstate trade or
commerce and, as such, it is subject to the Sherman Act until ex64
empted" by Congress.
There were two dissenting opinions submitted by Justices
65
Douglas and Marshall in Flood v. Kuhn.
While these opinions
focus on different aspects of professional baseball and its exemption, they represent interesting arguments for "bring(ing)
66
baseball within the coverage of the antitrust laws."
Justice Douglas called his brethren's continued upholding
of Federal Baseball "a derelict in the stream of the law that we,
its creator, should remove."

This is due to the fact that "base-

ball is today big business that is packaged with beer, with broadcasting, and with other industries. " £. 7
He also attacks baseball's reserve clause which makes the

68
players victims of the owners' "proclivity for predatory practices."
Justice Douglas refers to the players as "victims" since according
to the Sherman Act, "a contract which forbids anyone to practice

69
his calling is commonly called an unreasonable restraint of trade."
Using Congressional inaction as a guide to

~aintaining

the in-

consistent application of federal antitrust laws is also denounced
by Justice Douglas.

This is an aberration in itself since the

(48)

Supreme Court has already said that Congressional silence should
70
not prevent judicial re-examination of its own doctrines.
As a
result, "the unbroken silence of Congress should not prevent us

71
from correcting our own mistakes."
Justice Marshall's dissent takes homage in the fact that
baseball's reserve system makes the players virtual slaves of the
owners.

"The essence of that system is that a player is bound

to the club with which he first signs a contract for the rest of
72
his playing days."
As a result, the reserve system acts as
an unreasonable restraint of trade.

Therefore, Justice

~~rshall

felt compelled to make the following commentary:
"We do not lightly overrule our prior
constructions of federal statutes, but when
our errors deny substantial federal rights,
like the right to compete freely and effectively to the best of one's ability as guaranteed
by the antitrust laws, we must admit our error
73
and correct it."
Justice Marshall also gave a solution to the debate over
retroactively solving the problem as court decisions usually do,
or deferring to the Congress and its prospective effects on
eliminating the exemption.

Simply put, the Court can make its

reversal prospective only.

As Justice !-1arshall stated, "baseball

should be covered by the antitrust laws beginning with this case

74
and henceforth, unless Congress decides otherwise."

(49)
II.

Scholarly Criticisms

Scholars have tended to agree with Justices Burton, Douglas,
and Marshall.
Court's,:

The most frequent criticisms are aimed at the

strict adherence to stare

decisis~

deference to a

Congressional solution; and proclivity in upholding the exemption
while the Court itself has classified it as being "unrealistic,

75
inconsistent, or illogical."
Stare decisis is an important tool in maintaining consistency
in judicial interpretations of the law.
used to imprison reason.

However, it should not be

When faced with previous decisions that

are out of sync with the present conditions, the Court should
acknowledge this or fear falling out of step with the times.
C. Paul Roger believes that Flood v. Kuhn "illustrates the
kind of illogical and inconsistent propositions that a strict

76
adherence to the principles of stare decisis can produce."
In other words, is maintaining uniform and consistent interpretations
of the law "justified when the result is the affirmance of a
77
decision acknowledged to be an anachronism?"
Nancy Jean Meissner agrees.
haS

11

She says that the Supreme Co,rr:.

ClOSed r_i ts'. dOOrS and refused to right admitted \ITOn.§;S o 11

Instead of repeali:1g the anti trust e:{emption it e;ave to baseball
in 1922, the judiciary has chosen "to rely on an anor:1alcms application of stare decisis in refusing to grant relief from a system
which claimed perpetual control of employees in an industry rife

78
with violation of the Sherman Act."
11

'tlhile ?load possibly represents the Court's greatest

(50)

expression of deference to Congressional silence,"

79

many scholars

espouse the opposite view which states that judicial decisions
should not be influenced by legislative inactivity.

Justice

Frankfurter summed up this opposing viewpoint in the 1940 case,
Helvering v. Hallock:
"It would require very persuasive circmnstances
enveloping Congressional silence to debar this
court from re-examining its own doctrines.
To explain the cause of non-action by Congress
when Congress itself sheds no light is to venture

80
into speculative unrealities."
Judicial deference to Congress is also criticized for its buckpassing nature which has no guarantee for success.

As the Notre

Dame Lawyer states, the Supreme Court could have resolved the
''retroactivity difficulties by ruling prospectively instead of

81
deferring to Congress."
exemption.

This would have rescinded the anomalous

This is especially important since "there is no guarantee

that Congress will act in the future to overrule the baseball

82
decisions which the Supreme Court has now come to loathe."
The third major reason why scholars are critical of Toalson
and Kuhn, is that baseball's exemption is an illogical aberration
from the Court's rulings with regard to other professional sports
and businesses.
Philip 1.

V~rtin

feels that there are problems with the Court's

rationale in Flood in lieu of the fact that it still classifies

(51)
baseball's present status as an aberration.

He proclaims that,

"this is rather strong language which indicates that the reserve

83
system does not measure up to legal standards."

Martin adds

that, "the anomalous baseball exemption constitutes a denial of
individual rights being upheld by the exercise of some very dubious
84
legal reasoning."
Perhaps the most stinging remarks on the judiciary's continuance of this anomaly were made by Lionel

s.

Sobel before the

House Select Committee on Professional Sports in 1976.

He said

that, "professional baseball is the only exempt enterprise whose
exemption is not derived from a statute enacted by this Congress,
85
but rather from an exemption created by a court."
Section 2.3 - Congressional Silence
The sports triangle has taken on a new twist with regard to
this issue of baseball's antitrust exemption.

Although the

Supreme Court originally acted in 1922 by granting the exemption
to our national pastime, it has refused to re-examine the issue.
In essence, the judges won't judge.
passed the buck to Congress.

Instead, the judiciary has

However, the law makers have seen

fit to remain silent by allowing over 70 bills to go unpassed
in the last thirty years.

Therefore, the legislators won't

legislate.
This section chronologically reviews the "legislative history
of baseball's antitrust exemption, for only in doing so is it
possible to fully understana its current status and the reasons

86
behind it."

The second part of this section attempts to explain

(52)

why Congress has been negligent in terminating this exemption.
I.
A.

Legislative History

The 82nd Congress
In 1951, Emanuel Geller's Subcommittee on the Study of

Monopoly Power of the House Committee on the Judiciary, began to
extensively investigate whether all professional team sports
should be exempt from federal antitrust laws or if baseball should

87
come within the Sherman Act's parameter.

Three identical bills

were introduced and provided that the federal antitrust laws
"shall not apply to organized professional sports enterprises

88
or to acts in the conduct of such enterprises."

However, Geller's

subcommittee concluded that no legislative action should be taken
since it was unsure whether baseball's reserve clause violated
antitrust laws:
"It would • • • seem premature to enact general
legislation for baseball at this time.

Legis-

lation is not necessary until the reasonableness
of the reserve rules has been tested by the
courts • • • • For these reasons, together with
the Subcommittee's earnest desire to avoid influencing pending litigation, it is unwise to
attempt to anticipate judicial action with

89
legislation."
An identical bill, S.l526, introduced by Senator Johnson of
Colorado 'll'as also tabled \vhen the Senate Judiciary Corr.mi ttee

90
"voted to postpone its consideration indefinitely."

L_ ___

(53)

B.

The 83rd Congress
In 1954, Representative Celler changed positions when he

introduced H.R. 7949.

This bill would have made the antitrust

laws applicable to baseball.

Celler introduced this bill because

the "Courts had given preferred treatment to baseball • • • because
91
of the confusion confounded over what constitues a business."
However, the House Judiciary Committee did not act on H.R. 7949.

c.

The 85th Congress
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Radovich

that "the orderly way to eliminate error or discrimination •

92
is by legislation and not by court decision",

..

the House of

Representatives introduced in 1957 seven bills to eliminate discrepancies between professional team sports under the antitrust
statutes.

These bills were referred to the House Judiciary Committee

and constitute three distinct solutions to the antitrust problem:
l.

eliminate the judicially created exemption by placing profession93
al baseball under the Sherman Act ; 2. completely exempt all pro94
fessional team sports ; and 3. place all professional team sports
under federal antitrust laws, yet allow certain activities, unique
to athletic competition and cooperation, be exempted from those
95
laws.
Although over 50 'Nitnesses testified in the two weeks of
hearings before Celler's Antitrust Subcommittee of the House
Judiciary Committee, Congress maintained its silence by not acting
on any of the bills.
In 1958, the House 1vas again involved in antitrust legislation
involving baseball's unique status.

----------------- ----------- --------------

Representative Celler introduced

H. R. 10378 as a compromise solution to the antitrust debate.
The bill declared that:
"the professional team sports of baseball, football, basketball, and hockey come within the
purview of the antitrust laws, but exempted
from those laws such activities of team sports
which were 'reasonably necessary' to these
96
ends."
Geller cited three such activities:

"(1)

the equalization of

competitive playing strengths; (2) the right to operate within
specified geographic areas; or (3) the preservation of public
97
confidence in the honesty in sports contests."
98
On June 24, 1958, H. R. 10378, as amended, became the first
piece of legislation pertaining to baseball's antitrust status to
be passed by a house of Congress.

However,

s.

4070, Senator

Henning's counterpart to Representative Geller's bill, was tabled
by the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee.

Thus, what promised to be

a significant attempt by Congress to meet the judiciarJ's challenge
to act on baseball's anomalous exemption, ended in typical congressional silence.
D.

The 86th Congress
The Senate re-examined its tabling of the compromise anti-

trust legislation from the previous Congress in 1959.
Hennings, Dirksen, and Keating introduced
virtually identical to the tabled

s.

4070.

s.

Senators

616 which was
Senator Kefauver,

chairman of the Senate Antitrust & Monopoly Subcommittee, intra-

(55)

duced his own bill,

s.

886 which "made the exemptions of

s.

616

effective only in the event of the agreement of each major league
Club to limit to 80 the number of players under its control."
Following hearings on

s.

616 and

himself by introducing S. 2545.

s.

99

886, Kefauver abruptly reversed

This bill vias identical to S. 616

yet excluded professional baseball.

Kefauver said that baseball

was excluded because:
"the problem of baseball differs from that of
the other three sports.

The Subcommittee wishes

to spend more time on the study of baseball's
complexities so that there will be an orderly
transition from its present status of almost
complete exemption from the antitrust laws to a
status of limited exemption similar to that of
100
the three sports covered in this bill."
Not surprisingly, the Senate Judiciary Committee indefinitely
postponed consideration of

s.

616,

s.

886, and

s.

2545.

The Congressional trend of introducing bills and then failing to act on them continued throughout the 86th Congress. In
101
the House, six bills were introduced pertaining to professional
team sports' relationship with federal antitrust laws.

Aside

from hearings held by the House Antitrust Subcommittee on these
proposals, no further action was taken.

In the Senate, another

s.

3483, was tabled by the

bill introduced by Senator Kefauver,
Judiciary Committee.
E.

The 87th Congress
Senator Kefauver introduced

s.

168, an identical bill to the

one (S.3483) that was tabled in the previous session.

The club

owners in professional baseball opposed it "to the extent that
it discriminated against baseball by limiting player control to
102
40 players."
However, the owners did support Senator Hart's
bill, S.l856, since it did not contain a 40 player limit.

Not

surprisingly, these bills died in the Senate Judiciary Committee.
103
Also true to form, the House introduced three bills similar
to S.l856, yet failed to act on any of them.
F.

The 88th Congress
Congress came very close to passing an antitrust bill re-

garding baseball's exemption during this session.

In 1964,

Organized Baseball voiced its support of Congressional sanction
of its antitrust exemption and equal antitrust status of professional team sports in hearings before the Senate's Antitrust Subcommittee.

The hearings were held on behalf of S.239l, a bill sub-

mitted by Senator Hart which was identical to the bill (S.l856)
that he sponsored in the 87th Congress.

The Senate Judiciary

Committee favorably reported S.239l without amendment on August
104
4, 1964.
However, "the full Senate was unable to act on it
105
end
of
the
session."
before the

lo6

In the House, 14 bills

identical to Senator Hart's S.239l

were introduced.

However, no hearings were held and no action
107
was taken on them by the House Judiciary Con~ttee.
G.

The 89th Congress
Congress took perhaps its biggest step toward acting on

baseball's anomalous antitrust status in 1965.

Senator Hart again

(57)

submitted a bill (S.950) which he said would:
"place the organized professional team sports
of baseball, football, basketball, and hockey on
equal antitrust footing and then [would~ grant
exemptions relating to the essential sports
practices as opposed to the business practices
108
of the sports involved."
As a result, S.950 would have eliminated baseball's distinct status
by placing it within the purview of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
However, it also would have granted antitrust exempti8ns to such
practices as drafting, the reserve clause, and restricting the
109
geographic area in which team members operated.
What is most significant about s.950, is that the legislators
openly recognized the need to end their history of silence on
this matter.

Senator Hart summed up this attitude in the "State-

ment" section of this bill:
"This legislation, then, is in response to the
judicial decisions which have placed the responsibility for reconciling the conflicting cases
110
directly in the hands of Congress."
lll
However,
The full Senate passed S.950 on August 31, ~S65.
a~ identical bill (H.R.l785) was introduced in the House by Rep-

resentative Hofton, but was never acted upon. Similarly, two
112
other bills "which would have nade the antitrust laws applicable
to baseball without specific exemptions, vlere also

refer~ed

to

~he

113
!

:buse Judiciary

Committee in 1961 but were never ac:ed upon."

Alas, Congress again shunned its responsibility for reconciling
baseball's antitrust aberration.
H.

The 90th Congress
Only two bills dealing with professional baseball and the

federal antitrust laws were introduced in this Congress.

H. R.

6, introduced by Representative Zablocki, was intended "to make
114
the Sherman and Clayton Acts fully applicable to baseball."
H. R. 467, sponsored by Representative Davis, was similar to
H. R. 6 "except that it also would have applied the Federal
ll5
Trade Commission Act to baseball.'·' Once again, no action was
taken on either of these bills.
I.

The 9lst Congress
Representative Davis again introduced legislation intended

to place baseball within the purview of the antitrust law.
ll6
ever, no committee action was taken on H.R. 2349.
J.

How-

The 92nd Congress
Following the Flood decision, the House Antitrust Subcommittee

held hearings on three separate solutions to baseball's antitrust
distinction.

Emanuel Geller, still chairman of House Committee

on the Judiciary as well as the Antitrust Subcommittee, acknowledged
that Justice Blackmun called upon Congress to resolve the established "aberration" that allows baseball to operate with an antitrust
exemption while other interstate professional team sports do not.
As a result, Representative Geller said that:
"It is for the Congress and for this committee

to remedy the illogic and put an end to this
senseless anomaly.

These hearings and consider-

ations of the bills before us are a step in
117
that direction."
118
One solution was proposed in four identical bills supported
by Representative Celler.

The bills were designed "to end base-

ball's judicial exemption by providing that the words 'trade and
commerce' as used in any provision of the antitrust laws shall
119
include the interstate business of baseball." As Representative
Celler emphasized:
"Enactment of legislation of this type would be
appropriate as a long overdue statement of congressional intention to include this very lucrative business with the mainstream of American
antitrust legislation ••

The important

thing is to once and for all end unwarranted
privilege and place all professional sports on
120
equal footing."
The second solution was put forward by Representative Horton
in H.R. 2305.

This bill proposed to place the four major organ-

ized professional team sports under the antitrust laws while
121

exempting certain aspects of the sports industry.

Representative

Horton said that the goal of H.R. 2305 was to:
"place all four major professional sports under
the antitrust laws.

However, it would exempt

from antitrust exposure those on the field

(60)

practices which, due to the unique character
of these sports businesses, are necessary for
the successful, competitive survival of the
122
sports themselves."
The third type of solution was suggested by Representative
123
Celler in H.R. 11033. Along with three identical bills , this
piece of legislation proposed to place the business of organized
professional team sports under the antitrust laws without exempt124
One such practice
ing certain practices of the sports industry.
that Representative Horton's bill (H.R. 2305) would have exempted
was the reserve clauses in professional sports contracts.

How-

ever, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. spoke at these hearings in favor
of H.R. 11033 since it would not have exempted such sports practices.
He said that:
"The reserve clause denies players their freedom
of contract, a liberty guaranteed through both
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

u.s.

Constitution.

The reserve clause reduces a

human being to chattel, a possession like a
125
piece of furniture."
Although these hearings were possibly the most extensive and
all-encompassing with regard to baseball's antitrust status, the
House failed to pass any of the three solutions.
K.

The 94th Congress
On May 18, 1976, the House of Representatives established the

Select Committee on Professional Sports "to investigate the

(61)
situation currently prevailing in the four major professional
sports • • • and to assess the need for any recommended changes

126
in the law. 11

One of the areas that this select committee

investigated was "the impact of federal anti-trust policy on
127
sports business operations. 11
In its Draft Report Prepared by the Staff Select Committee
on Professional Sports, Chairman B. F. Sisk and his colleagues
recommended that professional baseball be subject to the antitrust

128

laws.

However, this report was heavily criticized for failing
129

"to analyze the impact that those laws would have on baseball."
Consequently, no legislative action was taken.
L.

The 97th Congress
On July 28, 1982, Senator DeConcini introduced S.2784, the

"Major League Sports Community Protection Act of 1982. 11
was intended

11

The bill

to clarify the application of the antitrust laws

to professional team sports leagues, to protect the public interest
in maintaining the stability of professional team sports leagues,
130
and for other purposes. 11
However, the Congress took its most
significant step toward cementing its 30 year silence with regard
to the baseball exemption by defining for purposes of this Act
the term 'professional team sports league' as

11

the organized
131

professional team sports of basketball, football, hockey, or soccer."
By purposely omitting baseball, the legislatures have refused to
examine and clarify the application of antitrust laws to professional baseball.

(62)

II.

Why Has Congress Failed to Act?

In the past three decades, Congress has closely examined
the application of the federal antitrust statutes to professional
team sports through the introduction of over 70 bills.

"Yet

despite all this congressional attention, the law in this area
remains, with few exceptions, essentially the same as the Supreme

132
Court delineated it in the Toalson"

and Flood cases.

This is due

to the fact that:
"Congress has not seen fit to 'unexempt' baseball,
nor have they seen fit to reinforce the exemption,
judicially conferred, in light of respected calls

133
for a congressional stand on the issue."
There are two reasons why the legislative branch has failed
to act on the issue of baseball's antitrust exemption.

The

first is that the judicial decisions in Federal Baseball, Toalson,
and Flood have been approved by a majority in Congress.
"The inaction of Congress in the face of these
decisions, ~all~ of which invite Congress ta
act, would seem to indicate that there is a
policy favoring the exemption of baseball from

134
antitrust laws."
Congress has continually recognized that:
"the structure of organized baseball, and the
growth of its business relationships and internal
agreements which have been in reliance on the
federal exemption, are all integral components of

135
organized baseball as it now exists."

(63)

As a result, legislators argue that it would be inappropriate

to apply any type of antitrust provision.
Even though both Houses have never agreed on an antitrust
bill, Congress has almost always "endorsed the view that professional team sports are unique enterprises which require business
cooperation among competitors in order that fair and honest

136
competition on the athletic field is preserved and promoted."

137
In fact, on the two occasions

that one house of Congress voted

in favor of a sports antitrust bill, an antitrust exemption for
certain activities pertaining to the sports industry "has been
included and deemed necessary to maintain competitive equality

138
among member teams."
The second reason for congressional inaction is that "there
has been insufficient external pressure exerted upon the nation's
legislative representatives to sustain any action to dissolve the

139
exemption."

Put simply, organized baseball and its represent-

ative player's union lacks "an influential power base in any of
140

the geographical areas where it operates."

Whereas other businesses

have a larger number of employees concentrated in a particular
state or district, baseball employees "are scattered sparsely
throughout the country where an appeal to local representation
141

·..rould create minimal impact in comparison."
As a result of Congress's inaction and silence, the judicially
created and admitted anomaly continues.

Nevertheless, it remains

abundantly clear that "if the antitrust laws, in whole or in part,

(64)
should be applied to Organized Baseball, that decision !-will: be
142
made by Congress, not by the courts."
Section 2.4

Non-judicial and non-legislative solutions

"Since the late 1800's, baseball players have literally served
under the thumb of their economic 'owners' unable to enforce

the

143
antitrustl laws of our country against their employers."

This

inability to secure numerous basic employee rights through judicial
or legislative resolution, has

forced the players to unite in

order to establish a more equitable reserve system.

As a result,

non-judicial and non-legislative functions are being used to
resolve baseball's antitrust aberration.

Since the judges won't

judge and the legislators won't legislate, baseball players have
turned to collective bargaining, arbitration, and free agency in
order to eliminate the inequities of baseball's "monopolistic"
reserve system.

Nonetheless, there are those who argue whether

these solutions are adequate.
I.

Collective

Barga~ning

While the early 1970's marked the boom period for antitr'J.st
litigation, many knowledgeable observers believe that the 80's will
witness a diminished resort to the antitrust courts.
to the

~act

This is due

that the past decade has:
"laid the groundwork .:::"'or application of another
exemption which may remove many significant
issues from the purview of the antitrust laws.
The exenption in question is that which is afforded to employment-related agreements arrived at

(65)

144
through collective bargaining."
In 1976, the Nation Labor Relations Board recognized the
Major League Baseball Players Association as the exclusive bar-

145
gaining agent for all members of the players association.

As a

result, baseball players who had long been denied the ability to
prevent certain

~obility

restraints through the use of antitrust

litigation, "gained the power to bargain with club owners to

146
establish the terms of a system of reserve."
Not only did the players gain the power to bargain

w~th

club

owners, they used it (along ~'lith the threat of a season-long strike)
to their advantage in revamping the reserve system.

On July 12,

1976, it was announced that a four-year collective bargaining
agreement had been reached by the baseball owners and players'
representatives,

As noted by baseball Commissioner Bmne Kuhn:
"This new labor pact was the product of
compromise and intense negotiation.

But, the

significant point is that this settlement was
achieved at the bargaining table, not in ar- anti-

147
trust suit."
In general, the collective bargaining agreement of 1976
accommodated the mmers' needs for player control ivhile granting
the players a more competitive market !,or their services.

ltJOre

specifically, the reserve system was fundamentally revamped with
the elimination of the reserve clause which had allovred the
owners to

rene~

each player's contract for one-year periods.

key provisions of the agreement are:

The

(66)

"A player will have the right to demand to
be traded after having played in the major
leagues for 5 years.

He will have a veto

right over six clubs.

If he is not traded,

he will beccme a free agent.
Players who become free agents

. will be

able to negotiate with a maximum of 12 teams
starting with the inverse order of the previous seasons standings.

Each club will be

limited in the number of free agents it may
sign, being permitted a maximum of one if the
free agent pool totals l to 14 players.

HovT-

ever, a club will be able to sign as many free
agents as it might lose in a season.
The only compensation for a lost player will
be a draft choice.

If one of the 12 lowest

teams signs a free agent it Vlill lose a second
round draft choice.

If one of the top l2

te~~s

signs a player, it forfeits its Ho. 1 draft
choice.
Salary arbitration is reinstituted.

But if a

player is eligible to be a free agent, his dispute
can go to arbitration only by mutual consent of
the player and club.
The minimum salary is to be raised from $16,000
to $21,000 by 1979.

(67)

The owners agreed to add $1.85 million to the
148
players pension fnnd."
II.

Free Agency and Arbitration

The inclusion of free agency and grievance-arbitration procedures in the 1976 agreement stem from baseball's establishment
of an arbitration system in the 1973 Basic Agreement which ended
baseball's first season-delaying strike by the players.
According to the Basic Agreement, "all contract disputes
are now to be settled by a three member board consisting of one
representative selected by each party and a third mutual partici149
pant chosen by the two."
As a result, arbitration of salary disputes by an impartial arbitrator "took many issues away from the
sole province of the commissioner who is hired exclusively by the
150
club owners."

Controversy over this arbitration system did not evolve
nntil the fall of 1974.

Jim "Catfish" Hnnter, star pitcher for

the World Series Champion Oakland Athletics had a dispute with his
owner, Charles

o.

were to be made.

Finley, about how deferred

sal~·

payments

Hunter contended that "because a stipulation in

his contract had not been fulfilled, he should be declared a free
151
agent at liberty to negotiate with another team."
Peter Seitz, the impartial

ar~itrator

who cast the deciding

vote in this two-to-one decision, "fonnd that Finley had indeed
failed to live up to his agreement with Hnnter, and that in such a
case, baseball rules gave the player the right to become a free
152
agent." By the terms of his newly acquired status as a free agent,

(68)

Hunter was able to offer his services as a pitcher to any of the

24 clubs.

As a result, he signed one of sports' first multi-

million dollar contracts:

a five-year $3.5 million deal with the

Ne;.r York Yankees.
More importantly, were the grievances filed on behalf of
Andy Messersmith of the Los Angeles Dodgers and Dave McNally of
the Montreal Expose in October of 1975.
The owners historically maintained player control and avoided
competitive bidding through paragraph lO(a) of the Uniform Players

153
Contract.

The "Option Clause" allowed the club to extend the

existing contract for one year if the player didn't agree to a
new one.

"The clubs interpreted this to mean that the one-year

extension applied to all terms of the original contract - including
another automatic one-year extension, which made it a 'perpetual'

154
option."
However, Messersmith and McNally felt that since they played the

1975 season under the Option Clause (i.e. under the one year
contract they had signed prior to the 1974 season), they had fulfilled all contractual terms and obligations and were thus free
agents.
The grievances were submitted to arbitration with Seitz again
in the role of impartial arbitrator.

On December 23, 1975, a

monumental interpretation of paragraph lO(a) of the Uniform Players
Contract and the Ma,j or League Rules was handed down.

Seitz ruled

that:
"the relevant provisions did not renew the
contract in perpetuity, thereby denying the

right of a club to perpetually control a player.
Messersmith and McNally

are

declared free

155
agents."
The club owners responded by firing Seitz and asking a federal
court to rule that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority.
However, the district court in Kansas

Cit~

Royals Baseball Corp.

15
v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n.

held that:

"the Messersmith-McNally grievances were within
the scope of the .-_arbi tratio~~ panel's jurisdiction and neither the resolution of the merits,
nor the relief awarded, exceeded the panel's

157
authority."
The United States Court of Appeals' affirmation of the district
court's finding thus emancipated the players

from a control

system that had traditionally bound each player to the club with
which he first signed a contract for the rest of his playing
days.
As noted above, the result of the Hunter, Messersmith, and
McNally grievances has been a fundamental revamping of baseball's
reserve system through the inclusion of free agency and arbitration
in baseball's collective bargaining agreement.
III.

Are These Non-Judicial and Non-Legislative Solutions Adequate?

"It has been offered that as a by-product of the labor exempt:.on,
antitrust is no longer a predominate feature of disputes in professional athletics, primarily owing to the advent of collective

(70)
158
bargaining."

F..owever, are the non-judicial and non-legislative

solutions achieved through collective bargaining enough to justify
baseball's antitrust exemption?

Or for that matter, are they

adequate in establishing and maintaining an equitable reserve
system?
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn and Marvin Miller, executive director
of the players' association from 1976-1982, have opposing views on
these and other questions pertaining to baseball's antitrust
exemption.

Their opinions are extensively noted in Section 2.5.

However, it is useful to preview their overriding positions with
regard to the adequacy of these non-judicial and non-legislative
solutions.
Kuhn thinks that collective bargaining has removed "the major
irritant for antitrust liability over the course of the last three
159
decades - the status of player rights."
Furthermore, the collective
bargaining agreement reached in 1976, "is proof-positive that the
present status of baseball under our Cantitrust~ laws is appropriate."

160

Similarly, the recently fired commissioner believes that:
"we have demonstrated that baseball is acting in a
highly responsible fashion under the present law,
and further that if problems exist in the present
system they would not be solved through the
application of the antitrust laws.
thi~

Rather, I

it is quite clear that the application

of those laws to baseball would only be counter161
prodt:.ctive and detrimental to the public interest."

(71)
Miller disagrees with this sanguine perspective of baseball's
management.

He contends that, "what turned things around, of

course, was not the good will or fair-mindedness of the club
owners, but rather the Messersmith case • • • • Then and only then

162
were the owners first interested in modifying the reserve system."
As a result, it is still necessary for the courts or Congress to
remove baseball's antitrust exemption.

Otherwise, the owners

163
could return to "their oppressive reserve system with impunity"
after subsequent collective bargaining agreements terminate.
Others agree with Hiller and suggest that "antitrust could
still be an important device to maintain a checking influence on
the bargaining process ~of~ baseball

164
in

the 1980's."

They

point to such issues as player related rules not covered in
collective bargaining, league decisions with respect to franchise
location, and rules pertaining to league governance as being
applicable to antitrust litigation.
Still others contend that baseball's non-judicial and nonlegislative solutions are inadequate and inappropriate.

The

Sporting News, often referred to as the "Baseball Bible", wrote
an editorial entitled "Something Out of Whack" to describe baseball's

165
salary-arbitration system.

In it, they criticize the often

illogical decisions of baseball's arbitrators who demonstrate:

166
"(a) disregard for the dollar, or (b) ignorance of the game."
See Appendix II
Whether baseball's resolutions to its monopolistic reserve
system are adequate in solving the problems associated with a

(72)
business exemption from federal antitrust laws is yet to be seen.
However, one

~ust

commend the industry as a whole for its ability

to rise above judicial and legislative inaction, in attempting
to resolve its contractual inequities.
Section 2.5 - Baseball's Opposing Viewpoints
As noted in the previous section, the leading figures for
baseball's management and players' association have diametrically
opposing viewpoints 1rl.th regard to baseball's anti trust exemption.
On a number of occasions, Bolrl.e Kuhn and
appeared

~r

~~rvin

Miller have

congressional hearings to justify their opinions.

This section presents the opposing viewpoints on baseball's
distinct status that were voiced by the sport's leaders at hearings
before the 92nd and 94th Congresses.
I.

Bome Kuhn:

Maintain the Exemption

It is important to note that while Kuhn believes his primary
concern as commissioner is "to protect the integrity of the

167
game, II

many believe that his job is t o protect the owners.

Kuhn

was hired by, and gets his power from, the club owners - not the
players.

As a result, his viewpoint quite obviously echoes that

of the owners, who are the ones that benefit from an antitrust
exemption.

168

Kuhn's remarks before the House Antitrust Subcommittee

169
and Select Committee on Professional Sports

can be summed up in

four justifications for maintaining baseball's exemption:

pro-

fessional baseball is unique; baseball's management has acted

(73)
responsibly; application of antitrust statutes would be counterproductive; and the solution to baseball's anomalous status should
not be the removal of its exemption, but rather the granting of
an antitrust exemption to all professional sports.
One of the reasons why those in baseball's management contend
that their sport should maintain its distinct status, is that baseball's structure is unique when compared to other sports and even
other businesses.

Kuhn reiterated this point in 1972 \vhen he said:

"It is a mistake •

to think of professional

sports as fungible in their problems.
not.

They are very different.

They are

There is no
170

sport as different as baseball."
Specifically, Kuhn points to baseball's minor league system.
Whereas professional football and basketball teams acquire their
players directly out of college, baseball teams have to de'Telop
their players iP.. an extensive and expensive mir:.cr league system:
"The average expense by major league clubs to
develop players is $1.5 million apiece per club.
This is one of the reasons Ahy baseball nas

argued that it has a ri;::ht to a sreater player
control than other sports may have, because we
are in a radically different position from other
171

There is simply no question about

sports.

"

w.ique structure and problerr.s, Kuhn t'=lkes "price

In li.eu of
in t:1e fact that

l•..t..u.

'tTe

have tried to

'.Vhich, vlhile not perfect,

':re

~a,·e

a system of self-regu.latior:.

think has best sui ted the needs of

01IT

172

pa.r-::icCllar ind:1stry."

As the recently fir:::c co::Jmissi:)Jcer stated

:.n 1)<'76, "baseball's con6uct ~las been responsible."

173

In an outline of why baseball should not be brought under
the antitrust laws which he presented before the House Select
Committee on Professional Sports, Kuhn gave three examples of the
responsibleness of the club owners.

First - baseball presents

its product at a modest cost to the public and on an essentially
break-even basis to the cwners.

Second -baseball's internal

structure has provided a high degree of integrity in the game as
well as fair procedures for resolution of disputes.

And third -

baseball's minor league system provides wholesome and popular sports

174
entertainment for many cities throughout the country.
Kuhn goes a step further and claims that not only is baseball
a unique industry whose management is responsible in resolving
internal conflicts, but application of antitrust statutes would be
counter-productive:
"I believe that a thorough-going study of the
facts will demonstrate that the institution of
baseball is fulfilling its public obligations
quite fully under the present law, and that if
any problems exist in our structure, they

~ill

not be solved in the public interest by the

175
application of the antitrust laivs 0"
Kuhn bases this line of reasoning on his contention that
"the application of the antitrust laws may well threaten to upset
the existing labor-management agreement and endanger the ability to

176
solve future labor problems through collective bargaining."

In

other words, the advent of collective bargaining has superseded

(75)

the need for antitrust application in improving player conditions:
"Indeed, placing baseball under the antitrust
laws might actually unsettle the existing agreement between management and the players, and
make resolution of the labor problems through
collecting bargaining more difficult in the
177
future."
This is due to the fact that if the antitrust laws are made
applicable to professional baseball, it will open a Pandora's box
of court cases to decide the complex issue of "the extent of the
178
exemption to be accorded baseball's labor agreement." Such
judicial decisions could "threaten the carefully balanced bargain
that has been struck between the management and the union in
179
baseball."
Therefore, Kuhn asks the proponents of applying the
antitrust laws to baseball this question:
"Apart from years of litigation and tremendous
expense, what indeed will be gained?

What

confidence have they that their approach is
superior to the collective bargaining process and
the Federal labor laws in resolving what are
180
essentially labor-management problems."
Kuhn also attacks the logic behind those who criticize
baseball's anomalous exemption on the grounds that it is unfair to
apply antitrust laws to all other sports yet exempt baseball.

}~

says that the call for equal application of federal statutes is a
false issue:
"The fact that other sports are forced to live

under the antitrust laws is, by itself, no
reason to apply those laws to baseball.

Cer-

tainly no one would argue that the antitrust
laws should apply to baseball, simply in the
name of equality, unless the application of
those laws is likely to result in some substantive benefit, or at least in the absence
181

of predictable harm."
Kuhn notes that baseball's unequal status has been the result
of judicial interpretation and congressional silence.

As a result,

the sport has developed over the last 60 years in reliance on
the antitrust exemption:
"On the other hand, the antitrust laws were
applied to other sports at a relatively early
point in their modern development, and their
arrangements have been modified and worked out
over several years with antitrust liability in
mind.

The fact that those sports might

continue to survive under the regime of anti182

trust is no assurance that baseball could."
According to Kuhn, the solution to baseball's anomalous
status should not be the removal of its exemption.

Instead, if

it was up to him to solve the antitrust inequalities between
professional sports, he "would ask Congress to put all sports
183

in the same position that baseball now finds itself."

(77)

II.

Marvin Miller:

Remove the Exemption

Just as Bowie Kuhn is the voice of the owners, Marvin Miller's
viewpoints must be weighed in terms of his previous role as head
of the players' union whose members would benefit the most from
an application of antitrust laws to baseball.
Miller's remarks before the House of ReprsentatiYes can also
be summed up in four justifications for removing baseball's exemption:

the owners have a history of monopolistic control of

the players; the owners were forced to act responsibly; the courts
have urged Congress to act; and the exemption prohibits the
players of equal protection of the law.
At the outset of his first appearance before a congressional
subcommittee in 1972, Miller acknowledged that:
"Professional baseball players have an obvious and
direct interest in the application of the antitrust laws to the industry in 'loJ'hich they are
employed.

At the present time, no other Americans

in any walk of life are as tightly restricted
by monopoly control of their services as pro-

184
fessional baseball players."
Even though these remarks were made prior to baseball's
restructuring of its reserve system, it is important to note how
monopolistic the owners have been with regard to player control.
As stated in Section 2.1, once a player signs a contract with the
club that drafted him, he becomes the property of that employer's
club for life - unless otherHise disposed of by that club.
Miller defined the reserve system prior to 1976:

As

(78)

"The player may be traded, sold, optioned or
otherwise assigned to other employers at the
will of the employer club.

Such assignments

may be made without consultation or notice.
If a player doesn't care for that system, his

185
only option is to retire from his calling.u
Therefore, 11iller contends that the owners have not always
been as responsible to the player's and public's interests as Kuhn
would have one believe.

In fact, Miller says that:

"This comprehensive, monopolistic, lifetime control of the services of a human being in his chosen
profession clearly is unduly restrictive and excessively anticompetitive and should be determined

186
to be against public policy."
Kulm, however, believes that such monopolistic control was
eliminated in the 1976 collective bargaining agreement.

Shortly

after its passage, he said that, "it is quite clear that the major
irritant for antitrust liability over the course of the last three
decades - the status of player rights - has now been removed from

187
the sceneu

by the good will of the owners.

Ten days after Bowie Kuhn made this remark, Marvin Miller
gave his rebuttal to the House's Select Committee on Professional
Sports:
"I would like to provide clarification ~of~ Nr.
Kuhn's argument to this committee that collective
bargaining on baseball's reserve system has
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worked because of baseball's peculiar antitrust
immunity.

He suggested that the club owners

agreed to loosen the reserve system out of good
will and because the union could not subject them
to antitrust liability through litigation.
fact, quite the opposite is true.

In

Collective

bargaining in baseball has been impeded because

188
of its antitrust status."
Continuing his assault on Kuhn's praise of the fair-minded
owners who altruistically redesigned the reserve system, Miller
told the legislators that:
"What turned things around, of course, was not
the good will or fairmindedness of the club owners,
but rather, the Messersmith case.

By utilizing

impartial arbitration, subsequently enforced by
the courts, the

players

association obtained the

ruling that baseball's reserve system was not as
airtight as the owners had been led to believe.
• • • Then and only then were the owners first

189
interested in modii'ying the reserve system."
Miller concluded his remarks before Congress by calling for
our nation's law makers to remove baseball's anomalous exemption
in order to give baseball players equal protection of the law.
In again attacking Kuhn's viewpoint, the ex-director of the baseball union said:
"In

Kuhn's

view baseball is fulfilling

its public

obligations and, ergo, under his logic Congress

(So)
has no basis for removing baseball's privileged
status.

Needless to say, that falls far short of

establishing a basis for special treatment
accorded to no other unregulated sector of our
190
economy. 11
Furthermore, Miller criticized the Supreme Court for passing
the buck to Congress in order to correct an error made by the
judiciary.

Nevertheless, the Court has said

the power to change the status quo, and in

tr~t

Congress has

~uller's

opinion:

"that clear invitation should not be ignored.
The professional baseball player no longer should
191
be denied equal protection of the law."

III.

Unanswered Questions
In summing up this section on baseball's opposing viewpoints,

there are four main issues for justifYing either a maintenance or
a removal of this sport's antitrust exemption.

1.

Does baseball's

unique nature and structure justifY its histoD• of monopolistic
control of the players?

2.

Have the owners acted responsibly

enough to justifY non-application of federal laws?

3.

Would an

application of antitrust statutes be counter-productive to, or
enhance, the gains made through collective bargaining?

And 4.

Should an equal antitrust status between the professional sports
be reached through an across-the-board exemption or through the
removal of baseball's distinct privilege?

(2.1)

Section 2.6 -In My Opinion
I.

The Judges Should Judge
After the Supreme Court announced its refusal to reverse its

earlier decisions in Flood v. Kuhn, Senator Sam
nounced the judiciary.

~rvin,

Jr. de-

He said that:

"Baseball enjoys this exemption because of a
50 year old decision by the Supreme Court that
it was not an interstate activity and therefore
not subject to federal law.

The Supreme Court

'

.
could make mistakes '_in
1922 ~ , but obviously

with teams travelling 3000 miles to play one
another and with T.V. spanning the nation, the
notion that baseball is not interstate commerce
192
is nonsense."
I believe that the Supreme Court's "refusal to reexamine prior
statutory interpretations results in the application of stare

193
decisis by each succeeding court to the original r:1istake."

Although

stare decisis is admirable for the stability and consistency it
gives to judicial decisions, "a judicial unvrillingness to reevaluate
prior statutory interpretations impedes rather than assists the
194
development and refinement of the law."
As a result, I totn.lly
disagree with the Court's strict adherence to stare decisis '.'<'hen
the justices thenselves recognize their decision as "unrealistic,
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inconsistent, or illogical.''

As

C~

195

Paul Roger states:
"Courts are obliged to reach the merits of any
dispute when feasible to fulfill their role as
arbitrators of disputes and to ensure the progression of the law.

Courts, by reaching the

merits, may affirm earlier decisions or interpretations as well as reverse them.
failing to review the merits, •

But by
courts

affirm existing interpretations without regard

196
fo!' their worth."
Likew·ise, I disagree with the judiciary's insistence tl:at
"if there is any inconsistency or illogic in all of this, it is an
inconsistency and illogic of long standing that is to be remedied

197
by the Cor..gress and not by this Court."
Since the days of Chief Justice John l1arshall, the Suprer:e
Court has been recognized as, and prided itself on
final arbiter of our nation's lebal conflicts.
to the

silent

legislators, the

j~lstices

from their legal responsibilities.

bein~,

the

:icvrever, by dererring

have rerr.oveu -':"lerr.sel':es

As a result:

"instead of having t1m interdependent bodies
responsible for i:::prcv::lng and ad,:ancine; stat·..ltor:t
la';-;-, cn2.y the legislature has r<:>:;ponsibility
after a cocrrt has once spoken on t:'le sub.ject.
The judiciary is put ir. the ancrr.alot:s position of
being U...'1able to ::or::eC!t i ~s o~rn errors a'~

192
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Organized Baseball has changed dramatically since Federal
Baseball.

Its cames can no longer be described as mere exhibition
199
not engaged in interstate commerce.
Therefore, the Supreme Colrrt
has been grossly negligent in its responsibility to "adopt a
philosophy that takes cognizance of the effects that change can
200

have on the propriety of pTior statutory interpretations."

II.

The Legislators Should Legislate
Whereas I disagree vri th the Court's refusal to reexamine

baseball's exempt status, I also disagree with the legislators'
inability to respond to the Toalson and Flood decisions which have
placed the responsibility for reconciling this issue in their hands.
Unquestionably, professional baseball is a business involved
in interstate commerce.

It also is a business that practices

various forms of restraint of trade or commerce, monopolistic
control of its employees, and anticompetitive balancing of teams.
Therefore, Congress must enact some type of legislation "t:;, include
this very lucrative business within the mainstream of American
201
antitrust legislation."
Ifuwever, I am in favor of the type of legislative response
to baseball's antitrust exemption as proposed by Representative
202
It would: place all proHorton during the 92nd Congress.
fessional sports within the purview of the antitrust laws; make
the business aspects of professional sports applicable to antitrust regulation; yet

"e~empt

from antitrust exposure those on-

the-field practices which, due to the unique character of these

(84)

sports businesses, are necessary for the successful, competitive
203
survival of the sports themselves."
My reasons for removing baseball's exemption, yet allowing

certain aspects of the industry to be exempt are threefold.

First,

it would place all professional sports on an equal antitrust footing and thereby make them all accountable to the federal statutes.
In other words, this type of legislation would remove baseball's
anomalous antitrust status - by bringing its obvious interstate
business affairs within the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
Second, professional team sports are entirely different
from other types of businesses.

Congress enacted antitrust legis-

lation on the grounds that:
"the public will be best served by vigorous
competition between companies so that those that
are able to give the public the best product at
204
the best price will be those that prosper."
However, when dealing with professional athletics, the public is
best served when the sports' teams are evenly balanced.

Otherwise,

"it is generally agreed that the wealthier teams would absorb the
best talent and force the dissolution of the poorer teams and
205
of the leagues themselves."
Third, antitrust laws insist that individual businesses act
independently of their competitors.

"However, professional team

2o6
sports must, of necessity, be organized into leagues."

As a

result, they are dependent on one another and must be permitted to
work together.

This type of legislation would recognize the need

(85)

for collusion between the

te~~s

which in the long run benefits the

public.
The problem, hm.;ever, with this type of legislative remedy
to the antitrust conflict, is how to distinguish between the
business and on-the-field practices.

The courts would therefore

be brought back into the "triangle" as it would be up to the
judiciary to resume its position as the final arbiter.

III.

The Snorts Triangle
An analysis of professional sports and the antitrust la1vs,

with emphasis on baseball's anomalous exemption, sheds new light
on the "sports triangle."

There is no doubt that the courts and

Congress have been directly involved in, and had a tremendous
impact on, athletic competition.
result of usual

judici~

However, it has not been the

legislative, and athletic actions.

As

Nancy Jean Meissner puts it, "the lower courts have refused to
act in deference to the Supreme Cotirt; the Supreme Court has refUsed
to act in deference to implied congressional intent; and Congress
207

has refused to act, period."

Only those within baseball itself

have attempted to resolve the inequities associated

w~th

this

aberration.
Lionel

s.

Sobel summed up this unique representation of the

"sports triangle 11 when he spoke before the House of Representative's
Select Committee on Professional Sports.

ne said that the terms:

"anomaly, inconsistency, and illogic are really
words ·.vhich, in my judgment, understate the significance of baseball's exemption, for baseball
continues to be exempt from the antitrust laws
only as a result of something which I viev as
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APPENDIX "A"

Flood v. Kuhn, 407

u.s.

258, 282

Summary of Justice Blackmun's Opinion of the Court:
"In view of all this, it seems appropriate now to say that:
1.

Professional baseball is a business and is

engaged in interstate commerce.
2.

With its reserve system enjoying exemption

from the federal antitrust laws, baseball is, in a very
distinct sense, an exception and an anomaly.

Federal Baseball

and Toalson have become an aberration confined to baseball.

3.

Even though others might regard this as

"unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical," see Radovich, 352
U.S., at 452, the aberration is an established one, and one
that has been recognized not only in Federal Baseball and
Toalson, but in Shubert, International Boxing, and Radovich,
as well, a total of five consecutive cases in this Court.
It is an aberration that has been with us now for half a
century, one heretofore deemed fully entitled to the benefit
of stare decisis, and one that has survived the Court's
expanding concept of interstate commerce.

It rests on a

recognition and an acceptance of baseball's unique characteristics and needs.

4. Other professional sports operating interstate football, boxing, basketball, and, presumably, hockey and
golf - are not so exempt.
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APPENDIX "A" CONTINUED

5.

The advent

o~

radio and television, with their

consequent increased coverage and additional revenues, has
not occasioned an overruling

o~

Federal Baseball and Toalson.

6. The Court has emphasized that since 1922 baseball,
with

and continuing congressional awareness, has been

~ull

allowed to develop and to expand unhindered by
legislative action.

~ederal

Remedial legislation has been introduced

repeatedly in Congress but none has ever been enacted.

The

Court, accordingly, has concluded that Congress as yet has
had no intention to subject baseball's reserve system to the
reach

o~

the antitrust statutes.

This, obviously, has been

deemed to be something other than mere congressional silence
and passivity.
Union, 398

C~.

u.s.
7.

Boys

~~rkets,

Inc. v. Retail Clerks

235, 241-242 (1970).

The Court has expressed concern about the con-

fusion and the retroactivity problems that inevitably would
result with a judicial overturning of Federal Baseball.

It

has voiced a preference that if any change is to be made, it
come by legislative action that, by its nature, is only prospective in operation.
8.

The Court noted in Radovich, 352

u.s.,

that the slate with respect to baseball is not clean.

at 452,
In-

deed, it has not been clean for half a century.
This emphasis and this concern are still with us.
We continue to be loath, 50 years after Federal Baseball and

I

L__
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APPENDIX "A II CONTllWED

almost two decades after Toalson, to overturn those cases
judicially when Congress, by its positive inaction, has
allowed those decisions to stand for so long and, far
beyond mere inference and implication, has clearly evinced
a desire not to disapprove them legislatively.
Accordingly, we adhere once again to Federal
Baseball and Toalson and to their application to professional
baseball.

We adhere also to International Boxing and Radovich

and to their respective applications to professional boxing
and professional football.

If there is any inconsistency

or illogic in all this, it is an inconsistency and illogic
of long standing that is to be remedied by the Congress and
not by this Court.
be

withdra~~ng

If we were to act otherwise, we would

from the conclusion as to congressional

intent made in Toalson and from the concerns as to retrospectivity therein expressed.

Under these circumstances,

there is merit in consistency even though some might claim
that beneath that consistency is a layer of inconsistency."
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APPENDIX "B"
TELL IT TO THE JUDGE
Major league baseball clubs won 17 of 30 salary arbitration cases this
year (88 players originally filed; 58 settled before arbitration).
In arbitration, the judge decides whether the player's demand or
the team's offer is the fairer salary.
The Winners
Team
Offer

Player
dertand

Player

Team

1982
salary

Fernando Valenzuela
.f!lario Soto
Ron Davis
Doug Bair
Damasco Garcia
Dan Petry
Tony Pena
Mookie i'lilson
Tim Lollar
Jim Barr
Rudy Law
Joe Price
Bobby Clark

Dodgers
Reds
Twins
Cardinals
Blue Jays
Tigers
Pirates
Mets
Padres
Giants
White Sox
Reds
Angels

$350,000 $750,000
$295,000 $450,000
$300,000 $360,000
$200,000 $325,000
$130,000 $300,000
$175,000 $350,000
$ 72,500 $260,000
$ 90,000 $215,000
$ 50,000 $200,000
$135,000 $165,000
$ 37,500 $130,000
$ 85,000 $130,000
$ 79,000 $105,000

Player

Team

1982
salary

Team
Offer

Broderick Perkins
Bruce Berenyi
Nike Sciascia
Dave Goltz
Roy Lee Jackson
Bobby Castillo
Bill Sample
Kirk Gibson
Aurelio Lopez
Tony Bernazard
Bill Gullickson
Dennis Lamp
Steve I!ov;e
Julio Cruz
Len Barker
Lonnie Smith
Pedro Guerrero

Indians
Reds
Dodgers
Angels
Blue Jays
1'-vrins
Rangers
Tigers
Tigers
Hhite Sox
Expos
Hhite Sox
Dodgers
l1ariners
Indians
Cardinals
Dodgers

~ 97,500

$125,000

~185,000

$ 75,000 $150,000

$22'),000
$215,0CO

$1,000,000
$ 625,000
$ 475,000
$ 450,000

$ 4oo,ooo
$ 390,000
$ 365,0CO
$

325,000
300,000
$ 280,000
-'·
'i>
220,000
$ 210,000

$

$ 1h;,coo

The Losers

$136,500

$150,COO

Player
de::Jand

$ 33,500 $150,000

~320,020

$155,000
$185,000
$215,000
$220,000
$250,000
$252.000
$275:000
$312,500

~225,000

$ 75,000
$ 65,000
$162,500
$200,000
$285,000
~152,000

$200,000
$250,000
$100,000
$375,000
$365,000
$240,000
$275,000

~325,000

$425,000
$475,000
$500,000

$6oo,ooo

$350,c:::c
$300,000

coo
.,,...,co
$4oo,coo
"-~'?<:;
'f,;:,~,

•'-lc:; '"'
'+'j

$365,000
~750,000
~450,CCO

$5CO,OCO
:;i2C5 ,CCC
$58C,OOO
$750,000
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Section 3.1
A.

Introduction:
Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics

Discrimination against women in our nation's educational institutions became an issue of national concern in the early 1970's.
The legislators were inundated by numerous groups seeking equal apportunity for women with regard to admissions policies, employment practices,
financial aid, and treatment in extracurricular programs.

Dmllile and

Sandler, who did extensive research in the area of sex discrimination
in educational institutions, summed up the attitudes of those seeking
equal opportunities for women:
"Di:'ferential treatment of men and '..romen
exists in almost every segment and aspect
of our society. Perhaps it is most d~ag
ing, however, when it appears and is transmitted by the educational institutions which
are supposed to provide all citizens with the
tools to live in a democracy. In the past
twenty years, it has become painfully clear
that equal eaucational opportunity .,Till become a reality only if it is suppcrted by
strong an~ vigorously enforced Federal legislation."
2

Title IX of the Education Amendments of
that Federal legislation which would curb sex
al institutions.

~972

was

i~te~ded

discr~mination

~n

to be
education-

Specifically, Title IX provides that:

"no person

shall, or: ':he basis of sex,
be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subject to
discriminatior: under any educati·::m program 0r activity receivir..g federal fina.ncic.l assistance. ''3 (see Appendix I)

The history

prohibits

-::J:~

I'i tle IX reveals that C:ongress mode2.t!d the at'Jve

discri~ir:~tion

Qn th2 tasis of race, color, or

origin

~ational

L.

(111)
?"...o1·reyer, the ccmtrovers;; iThich has embroileci Title IX
decn.ce i.:> that 1mlike Title TI. -;;hic:1 i.s applied

:::~or

the past

i~:.sti t-:.<ti:n:.-v;ide,

~;any

fee:'.. that :'i tle IX "is lini ted in its coverage t.:J euucatior:al institutior:s, particularly (ar:.d, sane ·,muld say, excJ_usi·;el:-) to th.:Jse
educational pl~~grans or actiYities ':orhich receive federal funding."
As a result, it is

uncer~::l.ir: ~·~hether

specific programs l<hich do :10t

t:1e:::.;:;elves receixe federal assistance are ::ffected by l'it.le
other pr8::;r3.!ns at the col:!_ege or university receive such

1974 '\·Then it

~-ras

5

:~:·:

·. rher:

f:J~1dint;.

announced that specific pr.:Jgrarr:c, suc:1 as ir:"Sercollc;'J

iate athletics, r:rere explicitly included in the Title IX l'e.s·llations.
The follovli:1g year, the Department of Health, Education, and llelfare

(HE'w) issued its Title IX implementing regulations.

fdhile HE.W was

specific in its scope of Title IX's anti-discrimir.atory provisions and
warned that failure to comply could result in an institution's loss of
federal fu.'1ds, "the schools and universities argued that tile:i :;e:=ded a
more detailed explanation of 1·rhat the £Overnment would con::;icier corr:pliance

7
-..n_ th the ::..aw."

In

1979,

~d

responded to these requests and listed in

its final policy interpretati.:Jns guidelines for
athletics.

~itle

IX's coverage of

(See Appendix II)

i•;ark A.. Kadzielski says that "the repercussions of ~he HEH
regulati~ns

under Title IX

• have been felt most keenly by institutions
c

v

of higher education in the area of athletics."

~·lhi:!..e

caught many athletic directors by surprise and for the

these reg,..:.ls.tions
~ost

part have b2en

extrer.:ely unpopular, "changes, both significant and cosr.1~tic, have 'Jeen
0
/

r.1ade in athletic programs at postsecondary instituions."
Title IX has had its

~ost

significant impact in intercollegiate

-------------

(ll2)
athletic departments in the area of women's athletics.

Almost ever<J

college athletic program has experienced vast increases in the number of
women participating, the number of sports offered for 1<1omen, the amotmt
10

of money available to these programs, and the salaries for female coaches.
(See Appendices III and IV)
In addition, the number of scholarships available to female athletes has gone up.
scholarship

~oney

This is due to the fact that "according to Title IX,
for the men's and women's programs,

theoreti~ally,

should be awarded on a proportional basis according to the number of
11
Before Title IX, no college or '.mi ver zi ty
athletes in each program."
offered atluetic scholarships to women.

Yet in 1975, 5000 were offered
12

and in 1980, 10,000 athletic grant in aids were awarded to ''mmen.
Although there continues to be large disparities in total budgets,
coaches' salaries, and scholarships, women's athletics have tmdergone a
revolution in the past decade and Title IX can be viewed as its impetus.
However, it remains to be seen whether women's athletics will ever reach
parity with the men's programs or if in fact future interpretations of
Title IX will reverse its applicability to specific programs thereby
nullifying the advances made by women in intercollegiate athletics.
One corollary to the advances made in women's athletics as a result
of Title IX's emphasis on proportional equality, is

~hat

men's non-revenue

producing sports have frequently suffered from the redistribution of
budgetary and scholarship funds to the women's programs.

As a result of

athletic departments being forced to upgrade the funds allocated to
women's programs while generally not being reimbursed in an equal amount
by the respective boards of trustees, reductions have to te made in other
programs.

These programs are rarely football and basketball, and instead

L_

(113)
are such non-revenue producing sports as golf, wrestling, and swimming.
B.

The Sports Triangle

In the past decade judicial litigation, arising out of the anti),.

(F''

sex discrimination legislation known as Title IX, has had a prepondereus
~ffect o~

American athletics.

No longer is it permissible to relegate

women's athletics to second-rate status.

t~e

However,

judicial and legis-

lative branches have been inconsistent and often times in conflict with
regard to the scope of Title IX's application to educational programs in
general, and intercollegiate athletics in specific.
The judiciary has been faced with the question of whether Congress
intended Title IX to be applied institutionally or only to the specific
programs that receive direct federal assistance.

In North Haven Board of

13
Education v. Bell
pretation.

the Supreme Court rejected the institutional inter-

However, the Supreme Court is presently deciding on a case,

Grove City College v. Bell, in which a lower court ruled in favor of the

14

institutional scope.
Likewise, there have been conflicting interpretations as to
Congress' intentions with regard to this issue.

There are some

co~gress-

15
men, like Senator Birch Bayh who believe that rlliW's institutional application includes all educational programs as being within the purview of
Title IX and is in line vlith the original congressional intent.
there are others who disagree.

Senator Jesse

r~~s,

in fact, says that

HEW's regulations:
"are far in excess of the goal of insuring an
equal educational opportunity for ~e~bers of
both se;:es, and they go f:::.r beyond t~e i!ltent :.6
of Congress as expressed in that legi:::lation. ••

- -------------------------

However,

(114)

Although it is still undetermined whether Title IX will continue
to be applied to such programs as intercollegiate athletics which do not
receive direct federal funding, Congress and the c::mrts have had a majcr
impact in the revolution occurring in women's athletics.

In addition,

whereas Title IX is at the root of this revolution and can be hailed
17
"as a long overdue opportunity to alleviate discriminatory practices" ,
it has also had the negative affect of reducing the funds allocated to
men's non-revenue producing sports.
The sports triangle is in the midst of a critical year

with

regard to defining the scope of Title IX's application to intercollegiate
athletics.

The Grove City decision which should be handed down in early

1984 and the inevitable congressional response could result in a dramatic
restructuring of intercollegiate athletics.

As summed up by

r~dzielski:

"no one is yet sure of the extent to which
changes are mandated by the regulations. Pending lawsuits and proposed HE'Vl interpretive
guidelines will serve to shape the parameters
of Title IX's real l~pact on intercollegiate
athletic programs."
Section 3.2

Inconsistent Judicial InterPretations:

In the early 1970's, the judiciary became hea·rily involved in
litigation involving sex discrimination.

Cases were tried, in this

area, primarily on the contention that certain rights

g~aranteed

by

the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated.
~wever, vri th

the advent of Title IX, "whose avowed purpose is the elim-

ination of sex discrimination in education," women had another avenue
19
to achieve equality in athletic opportunity.
While the courts are receptive to trJ cases arising both out of

(115)

the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX, they have been extremely inconsistent in their interpretations of these laws.

(For a summary of the lit-

igation arising out of Title IX, see Appendix V)
This judicial inconsistency has been most evident in the five
most recent Title IX cases.

Specifically, the courts have been unable

to produce a consistent conclusion as to the scope of Title IX's applicati~n

to

educati~nal

programs:

"Some courts have used an institutional approach,
applying Title IX to any program in an institution
receiving federal aid; other courts have taken
a programmatic approach, limiting Title IX ~8
individual programs receiving federal aid."
21

In Bennett v.

~-lest

Texas State Universit;z,

six female students who

participated in the school's intercollegiate athletic program brought
a class action suit against the University contending that certain policies
22

and practices violated Title IX.

"The school argued that its athletic

program received no direct federal financial assistance and thus was not

23
subject to Title IX regulations."
The Texas district court held that Title IX is programmatic in
scope and, therefore, only those programs or activities specifically

24
receiving financial assi3tance fall within the ambit of this legislation.
This ruling is similar to that issued by the 1-1ichit;an distric·t court in

25
Othen v. Ann Arbor School Board.

In addition, the court denied the

plaintiff's claim that the University's athletic department was the
::.ndirect beneficiary of federal financial aid.

"In so doing, it rejected

the argument that indirect benefits to an athletic program may bring it

26
w·ithin Title IX."
Justice R0bert H. ?orter, in his summary ,jud.;ment f:;r the court,
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made a definitive justification for interpreting Title IX programmatically:
"The precise selection of the terms 'programs' and
'recipient' throughout the various sections of
Title IX evidence the clear intent of Congress
that Sections 1681 and 1682 and the regulations
thereunder apply only to specific programs or
activities which receive direct financial
assistance. " 2r(
In ruling that the federal aid must be directly allocated to the
program in question, Justice Porter emphasized that:
"In order for the strictures of Title IX to be
triggered, the federal financial assistance must
be direct.
The type of indirect aid
receivedby the university athletic progr~does not
bring them within the ambit of Title IX."
A couple months after Bennett
in Pennsylvania.
tr~t

·~s

In Hoffer v. Temple

decided, a similar case arose

University~ 9

women students alleged

the school discriminated against female athletes as regulated by

Title IX.

The university contended that its intercol:cgiate athletic

program was exempt from application of this statute since it received no
30
federal funds earmarked for that program.
The

F~ffer

court ruled in direct contrast to the decisions handed

out in Othen and Bennett.

"Adopting the institutional interpretation

of the legislative history of Title IX", this district court held that
Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in all programs at an educational

31
institution when that school receives federal funds.
Chief Judge Jaseph S. Lord, III, held that civil rights statutes,
such as Title IX, are entitled to braad interpretatians in order ta

32
facilitate their remedial purposes.

As a result, the court based its

institutional decision on an expansive reading cf the phrase
33
federal financial assistance" in Ti~le IX.
Th~

U.

s.

Supre~e Co~~ ~irst

'~

. .
recelv::..ng

considered the scope of Title

:x
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in 1982.

34
North Paven Board of Education v. Bell dealt with a sex dis-

cri~ination

case involving employment practices within an educational

institution.
plo~~ent

In addition to governing athletics, Title IX contains em-

regulations.

The plaintiffs, however, filed suit seeking to

invalidate alleged discriminatory hiring practices as covered under
Title IX.

35

The Supreme Court interpreted the language of Title IX as being
program-specific, although the opinion of the court did not examine the
legislative

36
scope.

histo~J

of this statute in determining its

progra~-specific

"Furthermore, the North ?aven court upheld lEi:' s regcla tions

as consistent with the program-specific scope of Title IX and -:hus
37
found the regulations valid."
~·lhile

the Supreme Court was definitive in its interpretat:.cr: of

7itle IX as being program-specific with reeard to employmeGt
ation, there exists

Q~certainties

ciiscri~in-

as to the decision's effest on Title
-c

.)v

IX in other areas, specifically intercollegiate athlet:.cs.

·rnis

is

~he

r·2sult of the North Haven court's failure to define the teYZl
7he apparent prograrr.-specific int.erpretatior:
si;r::.fica;-,+; (!ffects or, +.:-:e Virginia
~':)

..J./

its

at.~l·~~~.c

denart::1~r:t

!+o

direct feder:1l

•-.r, .. .;

..,.!..o;:.Y'!,...O

- v ..... - - ......... .~,._,_ •

distr:.c~

cm;.rt '::; :c.:.:in,_; --

:·,,~

·.;•::rsi ':..;,·
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p!'ogr:tm-specific interpretatio::-1 of Title IX.

Thus, the district court

ruled that the "defenda::.ts have failed entirely t::> estatlish a nexus
between federal financial assistance and the athletic program at
l.Q

(Richmond)."
Finally, the Richmond court rejected the benefit theory as espause~

by the DOE,

Citing Othen and Bennett as preceuents, the district

court denied the contention that the athletic department comes \nthin the
jurisdiction of Title IX simply because it "benefits from various funds
which are recei veci by the university en other programs •,rhich in tCU"n
u3

release university funds to be used in the athletic department."
Despite the Richmond

cot~t's

rejection of both the benefit theory

and the institutional interpretation, the 3rd circuit court embraced them
"as a means of bringing under Title IX's guidelines programs that do not
44
45
directl;{ receive federal funds."
In Grove City Collega v. Bell, the
judicial branch proved just how inconsistently it can interpret Title IX.
While the 3rd circ'..lit court

acl-'"~'1owledged

that iiorth Eaven inter-

preted the sex discrimination statute in question as being program-specific
in

~ts

scope of application, it adopted an institutional approach in

defining the concept of program:
"vie concede, as ·.-1e nust, that Title IX'c pro·risions,
on their face, are program-specific. ~·le cannot a;;ree,
however, that Congress intended to limit the purpose
and op:=ra tion of Title IX by a nar!'ovl and illogical
ir:terpre+;ation of its program-specifi-::: pro·;i.sicns.
Rather, we believe that Congress intended that full
scope be given to the non-discrir:ri.natory purpose
that Title IX •ras enacted to achieve, and that the
frogram-specific terms of Title IX must therefore
be construed realistically and flexibly. By so
doing, •• , cor:1plete accomodation can be achieved
between the concepts of 'indirect federal financifrl
assistance' and 'progran-specific' requirer.1ents." 0
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The GroYe City court also decided that when an academic institution
receives federal funds, each program within that institution indirectly
benefits from the assistance.

As a result, all programs within the

school must comply with Title IX's regulations.

47

.

As a result, the 3rd

circuit court ruled that "when the federal government furnishes indirect
or general aid to an institution, the institution must be the 'program'

48
referred to in Title IX."

In other words, the Grove City court rational-

ized that the Supreme Court actually adopted an institutional approach to

49
the term "program" which gives credence to the benefit theory.
While the Grove City case is pending in the U.

s.

Supreme·Court,

it is not known if the justices are going to decide on the specific
question of whether Title IX covers all programs at an institution receiving financial assistance or only those specific programs directly aided.
If, though, the Supreme Court rules definitively on this matter, it could
restructure college athletics and end the judicial inconsistencies that
have marred Title IX litigation.
Until our nation's highest court hands down such a decision, the
words of Kevin A. Nelson will continue to define the situation which
confronts the judiciary:
"The diametrically opposing deci:::;ions of +.he
district court in University of Richmond and the
Third Circuit in Grove City and Hoffer ~eflect
the confusion surrounding Title IX and the lavr's
applicability to collegiate athletic programs.
The Supreme Court's reluctance to issue a comprehensive decision that ·,rill de:'ine the scope of
Title IX in all areas has resulted in an inconsistent application of the la'I>T to athletic
programs. Although the Universit;r of Rich.':lond
court ruled that iior+;h :ra:ren eli::ri.nated 'l':..tle
IX's applicability +;c athletic departments,
the r;.0ffer (and G~ove Cit;r) decisions p~esent
valid argureents for the prohibition of gender
discrimination in collegiate athletics."50
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Section 3.3

Conflicting Congressional Intentions:

In 1972, Congress enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972 for the purpose of prohibiting gender discrimination in educational programs that receive federal financial assistance.

While this is an

obvious statement of congressional intent, it is not at all obvious if
our nation's legislators intended the statute to apply to educational
programs, specifically intercollegiate athletics, when the programs are
not the direct beneficiaries of federal aid.
Ttis inconclusiveness with regard to congressional intent is primarily due to the fact that Title IX ,.,as ushered into law without adEquate
public hearings.

In the House, it was made a part of the Educational

Amendments of 1972 in the full Committee on Education and Labor, rather
than working its way through one of the subcommittees.

As a result, it

51
Likewi~e,

was not debated in public hearings.

the Senate adopted Title

52
IX without benefit of the subcommittee or hearing process.

As Jesse

Helms notes:
11

adequate record of the legislative intent
of Title IX exists. Senators, Representatives,
and bureaucrats alike must vie,., and co53true
this legislation in a virt'l..lZl.l vacuum."
:10

While there is inconclusive proof as to Cocgress' intent in 1972
in applying Title IX either institutionally or on a prograr:1-specific scope,
there are proponents of both interpretations.

In attempting to analyze the

two sides to this controversy over congressional intent, specifically as
it pertains to Title IX's application to intercollegiate athletics, this
-"

-..

section takes three approaches:
attitudes and activities
IX's implementation; 2nd.

~f

the

1.·

~

\

lst. ; It analyzes, retrospectively, the
me~bers

of Congress at the time of Title

It explains the Departmer.t of nealth, Education,
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and Welfare's (~)-T~l~cy interpretations as well as the responses that
it elicited; and ~r~.· It describes the types of legislative amendments
to Title IX that have been sponsored since the HEW's 1979 final policy
interpretations.
A.

Congressional Intentions:

Newspaper columnist Judy

l~nn

The Early 1970's
wrote in a recent article:

"Thirty-seven words written into legislation
more than 10 years ago are about to reopen
an explosive argument over what Congress
intended when it passed the law forbidding
sex discrimiUation in federally subsidized
education."5
In attempting to analyze the controversy over whether Congress
intended Title IX to be applied institution-wide or on a program-specific
basis, it is important to begin with a recapitulation of the events leading up to passage of the Education Amendments of 1972.
The Nixon administration, in 1971, proposed a gender dizcrimination
amendment "which would have applied across the board to all programs or
55
activities operated by a recipient of federal assistance."
This was
supported by Senator Birch Bayh, who introduced an amendment to the

56
Higher Education Bill of 1971.

When

introduci~g

hi3 amendreent, Senator

Bayh remarked:
". • • as we seek to help thoze •,.;he have been the
victims of economic discrL~nation, let us not
forget those Americans who have been subject to
other ~ore subtle but still pernicious forms of
discrimination. • • • Today I am s11bmi tting an amendment to this bill •..,.hich will guarantee that wonen,
too, enjoy the educa1ional opportunity every
American deserves.")'
'tlhile the 1971 Bayh proposal was not passed, i t is significant
to note that it •ms undoubtedly institutional in its applicability to
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educational institutions.

In

additi~n,

it did not apply to private

institutions:
"No person in the United States shall, on ~he
basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of or be subject
to discrimination under any program or
activity conducted by a public institution
of higher education which is a recipient of
federal financial assistangs for any education
program or activity • • • 11
The district court in University of Richmond v. Bell, emphasized
the fact that Bayh's 1971 amendment was struck down by Congress in
issuing its program-specific ruling:
"In essence the (Department of Education's)
'benefits' and 'injections' theories are but
theories, or arguments, that Congress should
not have rejected the initial institutional
approach introduced by Senator Bayh. I~wever,
Congress did reject that approach and that
should have been the end of it."59
On February 28, 1972, Senator Bayh introduced an altered •rersion
of his 1971 amendment.

This proposal was clearly program-specific since

it only prohibited the actual educational programs or activities receiving

60
federal funds.
Nonetheless, the federal government, in its brief submitted to the
Supreme Court in Grove City College v. Bell, argues that the

c~~nge 3en~tor

Bayh made in his amendment was not intended to narrow the scope of the
sex discrimination

re~~ationc

in educational institutions.

contention that any other conclusion would run

coun~er

It is their

to Bayh's intention

61
to eradicate gender

discri~nation.

Senator Eayh agrees
1975 before the

Ho~e

~nth

these statements.

Subcommittee on

Fos~secondarJ

In hearings held in
Education, he ctated

that it is incorrect to interpret the cha!1ges in language that he :nacie in
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sponsoring Title IX as being more narrow in its application of this
statute to regulate only the particular programs receiving federal
assistance:
"In maintaining that the proper Congressional
intent was the narrow definition of program,
the critics are making the assumption that
the scope of Title IX • • • (is) distinct from
those of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 • • . This assumption is totally inaccurate." 62
Senator Bayh is not the only one w·ho believes that althoU£;h the
language of Title IX appears to be program-specific, the intent of
Congress

w~s

to apply this statute to all programs at a federally funded

educational institution.

In fact, 50 members of Congress filed an amicus

brief to the Supreme Court in the current Grove City 8ollege case.

It

is their contention that Congress intended to:
''prchibi t gender discrimination in all aspects of
the American educational system, to include
entire institutions where students reg~ive
federally i'und~d tuition assistance." 5
Vihile the 1975 remarks of Senator Bayh and the recent contention

by 50 congressmen that Congress, in 1972, intended to apply Ti!::le IX :.r.::; ::i t11tionally o.re :1ote1-rorthy, ttey do not carry much legal vreight.
is d·1c to the fact that

alth~ngh

:'his

such post-er:actr:ent remarks proTide

"additional evidence", the !:iupre!!'.e Conrt !:las con::.:::te!i.tly r'Jlecl

t~a':. po~t-

enaci:;::!e!;t re:::arY.s cr eve:1ts ''are unreli:1ble guides te> :c:-ngress:_or:a.:..
:.:-: :.ent. ''

-J

_,.,ac:..-.... ..-:,.-.-.
.__..;

--~--·

(l24)
subseq~-~cnt

t8 its passa;e :.s :-:t:ch clea=er.

m.1.:nero·.u: responses to t::.c :Zd policy

~ec"::,e:.l

.ss·:e:::.·al

pr::>p:~sals ~·i~ic:"

interpretatio;~s.

~::.;;,art:.:e::ts

·. :cuLl :"ave 0Xe[;:ptec :1':l:.let::.::

66

t~e i~d

to publi:h policy interpretations regarding the

inple~~ntation

of

I'i tle IX and include reasonable pro·.risions to brine; intercollegiate c:.thle'::ic

67
noted by ':'honas A.

acti V:. ties '\vi thin the p1trview of this statute.
Cox:

"F!'om the process by ~vhicl: these matters ~vere
considered, it seems !'easonable to conclude
that by 1974, Congress agreed that Title IX
applied to inte!'collec;iate sports and sought
to assure only that ~ regulate with particular
6
care in this area."
The first policy interpretation issued by ?.2'-'l, "'l':1e -:'i tle IX

69
Regulations", beca'!le effective en July 25, 1975.
year moratoritun on its application and s-:.1bsequent

It contair.•~d a three
enforc~me::t

·,rith rega!'d

70
to intercollegiate athletic programs.

This polic::,r statement is extrer.:e-

ly significant because !{EH interpreted "progrN:Js" ':hat q':.lalify as recei·ri:1g federal aid in the broad, institutional scope.

irEd .:tated that a

program '';·rill be subject to the !'equirenent::; of (the -::::. ~le :=:<) l'Cf.Stllation

7l
i:' it recei'res or benefits frorr: (federal financial) assistance."

tinder :illd' s "oenefi ting" appr~ac!J., ':i tle IX applies

:o

intercolle6-

iate athletic prograr.;s irregardless o:~ ~·;!::ether or :;.ot it receives direct
72
A::; long ~s any progra~ or ac~ivity
an educatior,al
federal f',:.::ding.
institution receives :'ederal aid, the athletic

dc~ar~~ent

is

~ulpable

to
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this legislation's regulations.
Hr.."'Yl' s

1975 regulations also called for "equity for men and i·romen

athletes in scholarships, equipment, facilities, coaching and other

73
CQmponents of sports programs."

Such broad interpretations of the

original legislation is also significant since Congress refused to invalidate them in the face of ang17 responses from those involved Hith

74
intercollegiate athletics.
John A. Fuzak, President of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association, argued before a congressional

subco~ittee

that

~d's

regulations are inconsistent with the provisions of Title IX:
"I have read both Title IX and the HEW regulations,
and if I may be permitted to say so, I find incredible disparities - in plain English - beti.;reen
what Title IX a75ually says and what HEW says
Title IX says."
The focal point of his argument is that Title IX is to applied
to any program or activity that receives federal assistance.

However,

intercollegiate athletic programs are not the recipients of aid from

76
the federal government.

As a result, he is unable to .justi.f-J how iilltl

ca.."l expand "the literal language of Title IX, to cover not only education
programs 'ilhich receive federal assistance, but also those ":vhic!-< benefit
11
from th?. t assistance."
Furthermore, he co :te::1ds that vrhile Title IX is designed to be a
prohibition of gender discricination, j[£J;-l has converted it into an a:::':'imative requirement cf social action:
"If Congress wants to write or mandate such a social
action program, it can ~urely do so to the extent
permitted by our Constitution, but •,re submit :nest
urgently that such a program i1 not consistent Hith
the stat'J.te now on the books." 8
h.lthough Congress, as a ;.;rhcle, supported the HE'd !'egulations, there

(126)
were members who opposed the departmental interpretations.

Representative

Ronald Mottl even went so far as to say that "the bureaucrats in IIDI are
all wet on this proposal."

79

While he claims to be in favor of sex dis-

crimination and equal opportunities for women in our educational

instit~tions,

80

"this is not the way to go about it."
In the Senate, Jesse Helms led the opposition to the HLIN's 1975
regulations.

He said that the regulations published by

~~

bear little

resemblance to Title IX:
"Through overbroad interpretation inconsistent
with the congressional enactment, HEW has extended the meaning of the term 'education' to
embrace programs, activities, and services
which are not actually part of the educational
curriculum, such as athle~lcs, student housing,
medical care, etcetera."
He was also opposed to HEW's inclusion of a benefit theory since
it brings within the coverage of Title IX programs or activites which do
not receive direct federal assistance:
"Thus, the Department has made vague that which
was precise, and with the nebulous legal environ~ent that it has intentionally created, the
Department now has the latitude to arbitrarily
dictate 'law' that will a.£fect every schoolchi2..d
and student in America."u
However, Caspar Td. 'deinbcrger, who was SccretarJ of i-IEH at the
time of its 1975 regulations, refuted the statements
opposition to its broad interpretations.
encar:.pass only "those matters He

~·rere

~ade

by those in

:Ie said that the i-Z.l rcGulatic:1s

23
advised the Conf;res.:; included.''

In add.i tion, 'r'leinberger justified his department's interpretations as

24

being consistent 1-Tith Title IX, Title VI, and the Javitts' !1.mendment.
Due to pressures exerted upon the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) and
iiE'i'l "oy the tmi ver::;i ties and col:e;::;cs, n. ne•.: .set of c;·..!ic.:elines '.·Jere

iss~ed

(l27)

85
for public

co~ent

in

Dece~ber

of 1978.

Due to controversies over the

86

drafted version, they were not implemented until December 11, 1979.
'I'he final policy interpretations issued by HEW again institutionally
apply Title IX to college athletic programs.

However, it does acknowledge

the historical emphasis on male intercollegiate sports, and therefore in-

87
eludes a two-stage approach to compliance and affirmance.
The goal of the first stage is to eliminate gender discrimination
in intercollegiate athletics.

It requires the allocation of "substantially

88
equal average per capita funds" to participating male and female athletes.
In lieu of college football's unique status with regard to number of
participants and cost of funding a team, HEW provides collegiate athletic
departments with a loophole:
" • • • discrepancies in average per capita expenditures for males and females will not be considered a violation of Title IX if the institution can
sho-vr the differences are due to 'non discriminatory
factors' such as the nas~e or level of competition
of a particular sport." ';}
The second stage requires schools to continue affiroative steps
to encourage the growth of women's athletic programs.

In addition, ed-

11cational institutions are to eliminate the discriminatorJ effects of the

90
historic emphasis on men's athletics -vrithin a "reasonable time".
Specifically, the final :ID·l policy interpretations set forth a new
statement respecting the scope of Title IX's covera6c.

It addresses the

areas of athletic financial assistance and other athletic benefits and
01
.;-

opportunities.
~lith

respect to athletic financial assistance, ;m...' will determine

conpliance in regard to scholarship aid in accordance with the total
financial aid provided to male and female athletes:
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"Neither a proportionate number of scholarships
nor individual scholarships of equal dollar
value are required. Rather, the total amount
of scholarship aid must be substantially P§~
portionate to participation rates by sex."
In evaluating the area of other athletic benefits and opportunities,
HEW bases compliance on a number of non-financially measurable factors.

These range from travel and per diem expenses, to provisions of housing
and dining services and facilities.

(For a complete listing of benefits

required in HEW's 1979 final policy interpretations, as well as the
complete wording of the section relating to intercollegiate athletics,
see Appendix II).
As with

~d's

requirement of proportionate rates of athletic fin-

ancial assistance, identical benefits and opportunities are not required.
However, the overall effect of any differences in the treatment of male

93
and female athletes must be negligible.
While the goal of HEW's 1979 interpretations was to

clari~J

its

regulations in conjunction with the Title IX's application to athletics,
it failed in many "rays.

As a result of its often vague and azbiguous

language, "it likely confused inctitutions as to their responsibilities

94
ar.d obligations under Title IX as much as it guided them."
Tom Hansen, assistant executive director of the :lc,\A, echoes the
less than

enthusiast~c

sti tutions.

response by

t~ose

representing educational in-

He characterizes r"..i..W' s 1979 policies as, "q•.1ite der..andine;,

quite complicated, and difficult to administer because of their complexity."
In addition, he is especially disturbed by the scholarship provi.sion because it fails to "take account of ability."
the author of nucerous :1rticles on ::litle IX,

96

Or, as '::'homas .J. Flyr;are,

~tates:

95

(129)
I

"It does not appear that this proposed policy
interpretation clears up any of the difficult
questions that have existed since Title IX
was enacted."97
Although the final policy interpretations issued in 1979 by HEW
still contain ambiguous and confusing provisions, it does offer more
98
clarity and guidance than the HEW's earlier regulations.
\'llmt is most
significant about the two policy interpretations, is that they represent
the efforts of a departmental agency to impose a regulatory bridle over
the previously unregulated programs involved in intercollegiate athletics.

99

In addition, while HE.W's final interpretations concede certain accorr.mocations
to revenue producing sports, it maintains strong concerns

OP-

behalf of anti-

discriminatory groups:
"Whether the overall effect of this balancing
act has been to tip the scales in favor of
the interests of the status quo over those of100
change, only time and enforcement will tell."
C.

Congressional Intentions:

The Early 1980's.

vfuile debate continues over specific provisions of the final HZd
regulations, the controversy surrounding Title IX

persis~s

on a mere
101

basic point:

should intercollegiate athletics be co•r-:?red by Title IX?

As noted, the legislative history of Title IX is inconsistent and inconclusive.

Hoi.;ever, an analysis of the las:. three

~·ears

demonstrates

11

Gradual hardening of congressional attitudes that Tit:e IX even if not
intended

~o

in 1972 should novr be made applicable to all educational

programs

0:1

an institution-Hide bn.sis.

IP-

IX.

l98l, three separate bills .,.,ere in Cc::gress dealint; '-rith r:;:'itle

All three ',·rere concerned

especi3.lly

~d -'::h

~·ri th

narrowing the scope of it.:; c..ppli-::aticn,

rec;ard to ccllec;e a.t:-Letics.

It is ~ote•..;orth~,.- that all
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lC2
Senator Orrin Eatch introduced the first bill
attacked HE'tl' s insti tut:i.onal interpretations.

~rhich

directly

Under his proposal, Title

IX would be:
l)

narrowly defined in order to exclude student
financial aid from the definit:..cn of feder:J.l
assistance.

2)

limited in its scope of protection tc st~dents.

3)

2.imited in its coverage to only those sp~~~fic
programs direct2.y receiYir.g feclcr:1l aid • .Lu.::,

This proposal 1.;as str·.cc:<:: clmm because :.. t

;.;oulj

:1ave

lef~

fac·.:.2.ty,

-rl.

..:...l._'l-:-

staff, an.:: adrninistrators vu.lner:J.ble
addition,

scho~l

~o

3ende!' G.ic:cri!llnati'Jll.

~::mgres::;r.J.e!1

1-lere c::mcerned that Title
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J.E
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irregardless

~f

•,rhether OCR found the school in vi.ola+,ion.

In

add~.ticr~,

OCR's budget 1-rould not have been increased in order to reimburse these
schools, thereby decreasing the amount of money OCR 1rould have to spen<.:
llO
far ather ~~ti-diEcriminatorJ actians.
In lieu of these Congressional rejections of bills intended to
narrow Title I:X's application, it can he arGued that Concress bec;an
leaning toward a broader interpretation of Title IX.

Coupled >rith

~he

legislative branch's refuscl to negate the institutianal policy interpretations issued in 1979 by !1.Ed, it is even more apparent that Cone;ress
presently intends Title IX to apply to

a~l

programs at a federally assisted

institution.
'I'his is especially eYident in the congressional rcsp-:mse to the
Reagan administration's pasition with respect to this statute.
in August, 1981, the Presidential Task Force on RegulatorJ

Becirilling

~elief

announced

that it will review the HEVl policy interpretations vrith respect to inter111
Claiming "over.vhelming" public support, for its
collegiate athletics.
reviei-T of the Title IX athletic policies, the task force has beg:m te>

112
consider the repeal of the intercolle8iate at!uetic regtliations.
In additi·:m, on August 1, 1983, ?resident

3.ea~;an re~.arked

t::at he

was col!L'!litted to "assure that e·rery ;roman has an equal opp0rtunity to
ll3
fiowever, four days ::i.ater, his adn:inistratio:1
achieve the American dream."
petitioned the Supreme Sourt in the pending Grave City College case to
decide only that the financial aid department at this callec;e is c0vered
by Title IX.

In other words, Title IX should be interpreted on a

pragr~-

specific basis.
This has raised the i:::e of 1-mnen' s groups and se:1t a collective
sh•.1ci.ci.er through the hal2..s of Congress.

As Representative Cla·.1dine Schneider,

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
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who immediately submitted a brier to the Supreme Court contrary to the
Reagan administration's position, says:
"Congress intended in its wording to prohibit
gender discrimination in all aspects of
the American educational system, to include
entire institutions where students receive
federally funded tuition assistance. • ••
Unless a class was directly funded by the
government, and that is rare, you cotud ll4
exclude women or give preference to men."
On November 16, 1983, Congress wrote its most recent passage in the
turbulent legislative history of Title IX.

Repudiating the Reagan ad-

ministration, the House approved Representative Schneider's resolution
granting the broadest possible application of Title IX.

The resolution

expresses the sense of the House that Title IX "not be amended or altered
in any manner which 1-rill lessen comprehensive coverage" of equal opportunities

115
for females in education.
While the early legislative history of Title IX suggests that Congress originally intended it to be program-specific, illiW's policy interpretations and the subsequent congressional actions denote that the legislators presently propose this statute to be applied institutionally.

The

impact that an institutional application of Title IX a:1d its policy regulations ;muld have on intercol2.egiate athletics is bmfold.
ly, it would continue and, in fact, increase the
athletics.

gro~·rth

l•iost ob·rious-

in •,ramen 's

:tovreYer, it could also have a detrimental eff2ct en men's

non-revenue pr'Jducing sports.

The fcllo-.,ri!1g section examines the

positive and negative impacts that Title IX has, and may continue to have,
on intercollegiate athletics.
Section

~.4.

'
11..

~itle

IX's Ir:mact On :!:ntercoller"iate

At:Ue~ics:

:'he ::tevolution In Honen 's .'i.thletics

· 1072
· · l'.L'J enac ..ue d ln
Title IX ·,;as orlClna
-> •

.:..:c···re'"er,
·mtil
• • - -~t ·. r3.~- ."'ot
..
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1974 that HEW first included intercollegiate athletics within the scope
of its regulations.

Furthermore, congressional approval of the HEW

policy interpretations was not finalized until December of 1979.

Hone-

theless, many intercollegiate athletic departments felt obliged to begin
complying with Title IX in the early 1970's.

Faced

w~th

the prospect of

having all federal financial aszistance cut off because of gender discrimination in athletics, "many schools made the changes prior to the
ll6
release of the regulations."
The remarks of Dick Schultz, Cornell University Athletic Director,
are representative of the responses to Title LC's threat of losing federal
aid for noncompliance:
"without (~itle IX), we'd have difficulty going to
the administration for additional funds just on
the merits of building a better women's sports
program. It's ahrays easier when they have to
do it. Title IX supplies the impetus".ll7
The belief that Title IX is the driving force behind the ongoing
revolution in w-omen's athletics is also held by Gail :Bigglestone.

'.i'he

Homen's Director of Athletics at the University of Hew Hampshire credits
Title IX for the strides made in women's athletic programs.
although the adnlinistration of !lew Hanpshire ;.ranted to

She says that

increa~e

the aid

given to women's athletics, "Title IX ·Has the impetus b8hind the whole
118
effort of the university."
~emarks

are not the only evi:lence that Title IX has had a positive

impact or: the e7owth of women's athletics.

Statistics also reYeal a

definite revolution is taking place, one that

coincid~s

·with the

histO~J

of this statute.
In the three ;,rear period (1974-1977) follmdng !:Zvl' s ir.clusion of
intercollegiate athletics as fallir.g >Ti thin Title IX' s regulatio:1s:
the money budgeted by colleges and •..tniversi ties for athletics
..~ ':1a t •,ras all oca t eu' t o •,·TOr.J.e:,
- 1 s prograr:1s rose "'-_.L on ,...cf
c::. ,; "vO near l y

l
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:;: 119
8 p.

the number of colleges offering athletic scholarships increased from 60 to more than 500. 120
The gains made in women's sports are even greater when viewed
from the time Title IX 1va.s passed to Congress' approval of the final
policy interpretations (1972-1980):
the budget for women's athletic programs as comoared to
the total athletic budget has risen from less than 1%
to over 16%. 121
Before passage of Title IX, no colleges or universities
offered athletic scholarships to women. In 1975, 5000
were offered and in 1980~ 10,000 athletic grant-in-aids
were awarded to ·Homen.l2c
Participation by women i~ inter~olll~~ate athletics has
increased 25o% in this tL~e per~od.
These overall statistics describing the growth of women's
athletics are substantial indicators of an ongoing revolution in college
sports.

However, data obtained from individual colleges and universities

present additional evidence of the tremendous impact that this leeislation has had on their women's programs.

The

follo~ng

arc

~tatistic~

compiled from five different institutions:
University of Califor:Jia, Berkeley=
In 1972-73, the entire women'~ athletic b~dge~ was only
$5,000. This was increased 100~: the followir.~ year
to $50,000. Hm.,.cver, this representee only 2';S of the
':otal athletic bt:.dGet. In 1976-77, the v;~men's share
increased to 14~·; of the total budget ( .$442, COO) .12 ,_.
Cornell University=
3efore Title :L{ there ~•ere only three spor':s operating em
a $12,000 a year b11dget. In 1979-20, ':he :'igures had
ballo::med to 16 teaz sports ( pl'.lS 4 cl],!b sport~) ~-ri th an
ar.nual budget in excess of $34o,coo. 12 '
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University of New Hampshire=
The year Title IX uas passed, women's programs could boast
only eight sports, no scholarships, and only part-time
coaches. In 1981-82, the number rose to 13 sports, 24
of the 190 ,.,omen athletes on scholarship, eight full-time
coaches, two full-time trainers, a part-time sports information d~rector, and a women's assistant athletic
director. 12
u.c.L.A.=
Women's athletic budget almost tripled from 1974-75 to 1976-77,
$180,000 to $450,000. The number of head coaches, assistant
coaches, and staff positions also doubled during this period.
In 1976-77, 23% of the women participating in interc~llegiate
athletics (65 of 200) were on athletic scholarships. 7
Washington State=
Judge Philip Faris recently awarded between $157,000 to
$400,000 to be distributed among 12 coaches and 485 women
athletes in compensation for discriminatory practices by
the school's athletic department. !.fore importantly, the
judge set financial guidelines that require 37.5% of all
athletic funds be allocated to women's programs. This
figure is to grow at 2 per cent a year unti~ it equals 44%,
the percentage of women at the university.l~ 8
While these figures constitute great strides made in the
'ramen's athletics, many feel that they are not enough.
the

~fl

~oaches

~ea

of

Especially since

interpretations dictate proportional allocation of scholarships,
salaries, and general

f~ds.

As

G~il

Bigglestone notes,

accordi~g

to this proportional interpretation, Cornell •ramen athletes should be
allocated 35 to 40 scholarships instead of the 24 pre.sently
She says, '\.,.e're still not where ·,;e should be.
cut

•

1

t

1

,

s very, very s.Lm;.

~oie've ~ace

a~·,ardec.

pro{;Tess,
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-:Lhese figures, ba:::ed ::m the 1974-75 acadenic year, are evidence

ot "':he long road ahead :..n the 'mmen' s revolution far proportional equality
in

in~ercollegiate

athletics:

at. the :_·r.i·:ersi :y of South Alaba:-:-.a, the :::er. operatc:d on a
.?2CO, CCO bud ,:set; :·ror.:en received :?2., COC.
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at the University ::>f Utah, the women's budget rose fran

$3,000 to $53,000; the men's remained at $1.1 million.
at Memphis State, the men's budget 1vas $1.5 million; the ~
1 0
>vomen asked !'or $21,000 yet were allocated only .$l5,5CO. j
l·Iore up-to-date figures reveal that ,.;hile Homen's pr0grams are
steadily

increasi~g,

as is their per cent of the overall budget, they

still have a long •.-ray to go.

This is most e\"ident by this 1980 national

while 3Cf;~ of all intercollegiate athletes are women, the

statistic:

average >T:::>men's program recei·res only 16.4% of the total atb~etic budget.
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These figures represent the fact that there are 0bviously a lot
of institutions not in full campliance with the F.Ed regulation:::.

In-

deed, the 'da:nen 's Equity Acti:::>n League has .:::ompiled a list of over 133
complaints accusing colleges and universities oi' sex discrin:inati:::>:J in
ath1etics.
oent, as

132Hhile i t is rare i'or a judge to penalize an athleUc depart-

o~~urred

in the /lashir.gton State case, the real penalty for n:::>n-

com.r;lia:1ce has never been hancl:::d out:

less of all federal financi::.l

assistance.

?.i[!:~t:::

Until the Office 0f Civil

does pe::alize an institutian

in this fashion, Ewald B. Eyquist' s predicti:m :-:".a:; h:::>ld t·::-ue:
".::q•,lity for •..;o;y;en in collegiate at:U~t.ics ·:.3.:~ nat
Ce achieved ~o!' co~e tiMe.
• • • ·.::1e _r..r0C l·::~
~orne:: must overco~e (i:::) ~he afore~~~t~oned
rP:!.:ucta!1ce af ur.i ''ersi ~:; pi·es:.dcr. ";::: :o ':a:-::1_::..~·
:'·~~l:t.. ~1ith . r~tle ::(.''1::,~
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the minor
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::H;-

''Some of the r:1en' s pr:>t;ra.r.ls are be in;:; eli.::U::a ~2d
and d:-opped froo. our .~ollege car.:puGe;:; to::lay ::;ir::pl;_;
because the~· are not self-scrpportine:;. • •• (·. 1h2n)
•,.;e tal<:e 'che profit fY')m t:1e revenue prodcrcir.g
spor+.s and Eiv~ it to •,.;omen 's i:1terc-:Jllecia"':e
athletics, we have to drop '::he pr8[T?...':lS of ~rue]:,
baseball, GOlf, and tennis f':Jr the ~en.
E\·e:1.tually I~can see a iyinG process f':lr u:-:.1
athleti.cs." 1 ..:J7
'1:o::: Osborn~, football coach, University of :icbr-asl:a:

2..3 t!-::?..t 1·Te d.Jn 't .See ~Ihere 'the ::l:Jne:J'" is c::i::g
to co~e fr'Jmg
• The 3ol~tion ~a!; bee~"!

1-:ici.esprea:i proposals to eli:::ina:.e n.t:,leti~
sran~s fgr (the sports) ':.h::.t :l'.J n'.Jt ::-.a~:e
:n'.Jney. ".L..:;·~

"In :n.l!" conference, -:::ere is a ~eal di:. . . :'e!"er:.~~
af opinia!1 3.S to -:;=-:eti~r tne:r ~-rant -:e> ~onti~. ue
'-ri th a broad spectruo of in ~er:::olle~ia -:e
at:-ue:,:.cs. Se"rcral a: the ~.;.n:..versi :ies :.!'"~ -:>u.r
~~:1fere::ce hr...,.re !-!ad ~o ;::_,_.. e ,..:.p spo::t.:, eit:~~!..
:he sc~olarshlps :or ':hese spar:,~ or ~~1st
give ~p pa=~~ci;ation in t~ese ~po:-ts ~1toc:: theY. •·l.::;!

'~-
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Representatives of intercollegiate athletic

progra~s

are not the

only ones predicting negative results for men's non-revenue sports.
Newspaper editorials have also been printed prognosticating the demise of
these programs:
From the V10nroe (La. ) News Star :
"At a time when many schcols find i t difficult
enough to balance their books, they may simply
decide the easy answer to a highly charged
situation is to cut the athletic progra~H8wn
to that part which can pay its mm way." ·
From the Tulsa World:
"If •,.;omen's sports have to be given as much
money, personnel and emphasis as men's, it's
going to be - in the vernacular - a new
ball game. Hore money will have to be
raised or funds will have to be taken from
the present sports program."l41
From the Chicap;o Daily Hews:
"The (HEW) rules >rill have an effect on the
strapped financial circ~tances ~any
colleges find themselves in. Either more
funds will have to be raised for women's
athletics or the present funds will have
to be ~i¥~rted from the men to the
women.
While these opinions and editorial

co~ents

part, subjective speculations on the state of

present, for the most

coll~t;e atr~etics,

tile harsh

realities of Title IX's impact on men's programs has claimed various intercollegiate prograr::s.

Tvrs

the l·rrestling program at

::mch non-revenue sports aci'rersely affected are
Geor~ia

a:-.d the r::en 's s•,;irr.:ning tea:":'. at Hashingtor:.

Ge:Jrgia Athletic Director Vince Dool::y said !;hat the decisi-=m to
drop ·,.Testlin.;; ·,.;as "s-:rictly a

143

:re

~atter

of econo::lics" 'brought on by the

:aid that it w:.. s either drop or.e spc;rt or

'\rater dmm" several sports in order to di·rert fu!1ds t:J the •,.;or.:en 's
l4h
progran:s.
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At the University of Washington, the school decided to eliminate
scholarships for male athletes in non-revenue producing sports.

When

the State Attorney General reviewed the HEW regulations, "he immediately
advised the University of Washington to cancel all grant-in-aid to all
male athletes except in football and basketball.
so.

II

The u.1i versi ty did
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While the "they're-going-to-rob-Peter-to-pay-Paula, theory is

gaining ffiomentum on college campuses, there are many who believe it is a
fallacy to believe that Title IX will result in the ruination of men's

146
athletics.

For every example of a

~en's

program being dropped, they

cite an athletic director who says that a school can comply with
without hurting the men's sports.

~itle

IX

In fact, Yale Athletic Director Frank

Ryan says that in making Yale's women's budget the biggest in the Ivy
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League, no significant changes were made in the men's sports budget.
The following is a sample of the rebuttal arguments made with regard
to this theorJ that Title IX has a negative impact on men's non-revenue
producing sports:
The Women's Equity Action League:
"There is no evidence· that nen'::; prograns natiomride
are being cut to accon:.-r.oda te '\·Tome D.'::; athletics.
In fact, among the riCAA 's top di vi::don schools, the
entire sum allocated to women's sports bet•,Teen 1972 and 1978 came to less than hal~ 1 g~ tr.e bud~et
increases in mer.'::; sports programs.l
Senator Birch Bayh:
"I d::m 't think it is r.ecessarJ for us to prest::ae
that in order to give the ~;o::Jen ::;tt.;.dents in an
institution adequate participation in physical
educatior. this is going to destro:r the ~e!1 '::;
progra.'":'l

It

.

~~:::,

--

""
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At the University of Washington, the school decided to eliminate
scholarships for male athletes in non-revenue producing sports.

When

the State Attorney General reviewed the HEW regulations, "he immediately
advised the University of Washington to cancel all grant-in-aid to all
male athletes except in football and basketball.
so. II

The u.1iversity did
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While the "they're-going-to-rob-Peter-to-pay-Paula" theory is

gaining ffiomentum on college campuses, there are many who believe it is a
fallacy to believe that Title IX will result in the ruination of men's

146

athletics.

For every example of a men's program being dropped, they

cite an athletic director who says that a school can comply with Title IX
without hurting the men's sports.

In fact, Yale Athletic Director Frank

Ryan says that in making Yale's women's budget the biggest in the Ivy

147
League, no significant changes were made in the men's sports budget.
The following is a sample of the rebuttal arguments made with regard
to this theory that Title IX has a negative impact on men's non-revenue
producing sports:
The Women's Equity Action League:
"There is no evidence-that men's programs nationw-ide
are being cut to accommodate vromen 's athletics.
In fact, among the NCAA's top division schools, the
entire sum allocated to women's sports between ·
1972 and 1978 came
to less than half 1 o~ the budget
increases in men I s sports programs. U q~
Senator Birch Bayh:
"I don't think it is necessary for us to presume
that in order to give the women students in an
institution adequate participation in physical
education this is going to destroy the men's
program • Ill .9

' ------
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Representative Blouin:
"I am not as concerned, frankly, about the effect
it has on men 1 s colJe gia te sports. So what if
it does hurt. That in itself is an indication
there has been discrimination for years and
that it is time we balance things off."150
Ann Uhlir, former Executive Director, Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Homen:
"It's like saying I have enough money to feed my
boy children, but not my girl children. Parents
have to find a way to feed both their sons and
daughters."l51
Even the newspapers have written editorials refuting those that
claim HEW's policy regulations endanger men's programs:
From the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin:
"The ominous warnings that the regulations
will imperil male sports programs are
questionable. There is little chance that
the guidelines will affect the big-time
programs • • • and some of the smaller ones
are already in trouble because they're overextended."l52
From the Cleveland Plain Dealer:
"What the NCAA and the congressmen seemed to
have overlooked is HEW's point-blank statement
that it's regulations do not require exactly
equal expenditures for male and female
students or for men's and women's teams.
It does not seem to us that the regulations
endanger any existing programs."l5.:$
Whether or not this statute has had a negative inpact on nonrevenue producing sports is a topic of hot debate which requires a statistical study in order to examine Title IX's impact on both women's and r.1en's
athletics.

However, it is doubtful if even a highly sophisticated research

design could prove or disprove a causal relationzhip between this legislation's emphasis on women's athletics resulting in the demise
programs.

~f ~en's
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Additional funds are being sought to expand women's intercollegiate
athletic programs to comply with Title IX's regulations.

This has

fabricated new dilemmas in educational institutions "at a time when student
enrollments are leveling off, legislative support is limited, and the in-
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flationary spiral is continuing upward."

Nonetheless, the HEW regulations

can be seen as a long overdue opportunity to alleviate gender discrimination in our colleges and universities.

Even if Title IX adversely affects

men's athletic programs, thereby threatening the favored position of male
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sports, there are many who view this as a result of societal trends.

Or,

as Representative Shirley Chisholm states:
"I think we have to recognize that Title IX will
go against certain basic traditions in our
nation. Many have been quite comfortable, and
many do not desire to rock the proverbial boat.
However, this does not mean that we should not
be responsive to the large segment of society
which is now demanding their fair share."l56
Section 3.5
A.

In My Opinion:
Title IX's Impact On Intercollegiate Athletics

Some people argue that providing equal educational opportunities
to women threatens an American tradition.

However, a tradition offered
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to only half our population is not very American.
The benefits associated with Title IX that have provided the
impetus for the revolution in women's athletics must unfortunately come
at the expense of certain men's programs.

Since the funds necessarJ to

upgrade women's athletics are usually obtained from the men's programs,
male non-revenue producing sports are often negatively affected.

He'.rer-

theless, achievement of equality of opportunity in educational institutions,
the major thrust of the Title IX stipulations, is an extremely praiseworthy
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goal which should be strived for at all costs.
As with gender discrimination, the prohibition of race discrimination has been nnpopula:r with many people.

Southern plantation owners

cried "foul" when President Lincoln signed the Em·1ncipation Proclamation
because it had adverse financial and social effects on them.

Policies

that promote social change often have certain drawbacks to certain groupso
But when the policy is designed to abolish something that is wrong, it
should be carried out irregardless of the negative side-effects it elicits.
Sex discrimination in American colleges and universities is also
v~ong.

Even though many people involved in intercollegiate athletics

emphasize its adverse implications, equal athletic opportunities should
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be "supported by strong and vigorously enforced federal legislation."
Title IX is that legislative enforcer of equity in educational programs
and activities.

However, its goals will not be fully met until the

courts and Congress can consistently define their positions.
Congress took a significant step in that direction last month.
Overwhelmingly supporting Representative Claudine Schneider's institutionally interpreted proposal, the legislative branch has indicated its
intention that Title IX "not be amended or altered in any nanner which
\vill lessen comprehensive coverage" of equal opportunities for women in
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educational

progr~s

and activities.

How, it is up to the Supreme Court to decide whether Title IX is

to be applicable to all programs and activities at a school receiving
federal financial assistance.

Due to the Justice Department's decision

to ::;eek only a narrow rtuing in the pending Grove City College case, it is
doubtfuJ. that the high court -;vill is::;ue a broad i:1stitutional ir.terpretation.

:::'hus, until the Supreme Court does address this ir:;.portant issue,
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athletic directors will continue to avoid full compliance with the Title
IX regulations.
B.

The Sports Triangle

Judicial litigation and congressional legislation

h~had

incredible impact in American athletics as a result of Title IX.
Congress' passage of this act and the subsequent

Hfl~

an
Due to

policy regulations,

colleges and universities have been forced to restructure :heir athletic
programs.

As a result, there is a current revolution in

~omen's

athletics

that is allowing vmmen the opportunities once availatle to me'1 oply.
Gone forever are the days when a Donna deVaronna must retire from competition
the year after winning.an

01~1pic

cold medal because no one

w~ll

offer her

a scholarship.
However, the sports triangle has not canpleted its interpretation
of this anti-discri:r.linating statute.

Hhile Cong:r-ess has recently cemented

its position ':lith regard to Title IX's scope of applicstion, the courts
have not.

Still hung up over deciphering the c:..rr:bie;uous congre.ss.:.onal

inte~tions

at the tirr_e of Title :C{'s passage, the ju_dicia.r:l is

its or.·rn cGnflic-'-:.int;
":1h~t~·1e~ ~i tle

interpretation~o
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Public Law 92-318 (June 23, 1972)
TITLE IX - PROHIBITION OF SEX DISCRIMlllATION

Sex Discrimination Prohibited
Sec. 90l.(a) No person in the United States shall, on the basis
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance, except that:
(1) in regard to admissions to educational
section shall apply only to institutions of
professional education, and graduate higher
public institutions of undergraduate higher

institutions, this
vocational education,
education, and to
education;

(2) in regard to admissions to educational institutions, this
section shall not apply (A) for one year from the date of enactment of this Act, nor for six years after such date in the case
of an educational institution which has begun the process of
changing from being an institution :·;hich admits only students of
one sex to being an institution which admits students of both
sexes, but only if it is carrying out a plan for such a change
which is approved by the Commissioner of Education or (B) for seven
years from the date an educational institution begins the process
of changing from being an institution which admits only students
of only one sex to being an institution which admits students of
both sexes, but only if it is carrying out a plan for such a
change which is approved by the Commissioner of Education,
lvhichever is the later;
(3) this section shall not apply to an educational institution
which is controlled by a religious organization if the application
of this subsection would not be consistent with the religious
tenets of such organization;

(4) this section shall not apply to an educational institution
whose primary purpose is the training of individuals for the
military services of the United States, or the merchant marine; and
(5) in regard to admissions this section shall not apply to any
public institution of undergraduate higher education which is an
institution that traditionally and continually from its establishment has had a policy of admitting only students of one sex.

(b) Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be interpreted to require any educational institution to grant preferential or
disparate treatment to the members of one sex on account of an imbalance
which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons
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of that sex participating in or receiving the benefits of any federally
supported program or activity, in comparison with the total number or
percentage of persons of that sex in any community, State, section, or
other area: Provided, That this subsection shall not be construed to
prevent the consideration in any hearing or proceeding under this title of
statistical evidence tending to show that such an imbalance exists with
respect to the participation in, or receipt of the benefits of, any such
program or activity by the members of one sex.
(c) For purposes of this title an educational institution means any
public or private preschool, elementary, or secondary school, or any
institution of vocational, professional, or higher education, except that
in the case of an educational institution composed of more than one school,
college, or department which are administratively separate units, such
term means each such school, college, or department.

(161)
APPENDIX "II"
Section 86.41 provides as follows:

86.41 Athletics.
(1) General. No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently
from another person or otherwise be discriminated against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered by
recipient, and no recipient shall provide any such athletics separately
on such basis.
(b) Separate teams. Notwithstanding the requirements of
paragraph (a) of this section, a recipient may operate or sponsor separate
teams for members of each sex where selection for such teams is based upon
competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport. However,
where a recipient operates or sponsors a team in a particular sport for
members of one sex. • .and athletic opportunities for members of that
sex have previously been limited, members of the excluded sex must be
allowed to try out for the team offered unless the sport involved is a
contact sport. For the purpose of this part, contact sports include
boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball, and other
sports, the purpose of major activity of which involves bodily contact.
(c) Equal opportunity. A recipient which operates or sponsors
interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes. In determining
whether equal opportunities are available the Director will consider,
among other factors:
(i) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition
effectively accommodate the interest and abilities of members of both
sexes;
(ii)

The provision of equipment and supplies;

(iii)

Scheduling of games and practice time;

(iv)

Travel and per diem allowance;

(v) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
(vi)

Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;

(vii)
facilities;
(

Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive

... )

,VJ.~~

(ix)
{x)

Provision of medical and training facilities and services;
Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;

Publicity.
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Unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex or unequal
expenditures for male and female teams if a recipient operates or sponsors
separate teams will not constitute noncompliance with this section, but
the Director may consider the failure to provide necessary funds for
teams of one sex in assessing equality of opportunity for members of
each sex.
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GROWTH Jll COLLEGE PARTICIPATION, 1971 - 76
NUMBER OF SCHOOLS

SPORTS
'71-72

'72-73

'73-74

'74-75

-75-76

Basketball

215

346

466

600

640

Volleyball

181

285

396

467

594

Tennis

198

300

417

5o6

560

Softball

120

175

254

303

342

S'iTimming & Diving

135

213

265

298

327

Track & Field

76

138

180

226

283

Field hockey

165

213

249

284

256

Gymnastics

123

182

238

263

246

Golf

77

132

145

155

165

Badminton

70

98

124

125

117

301

409

603

739

843

TOTAL AIAT.tl
:t-1EMBER SCHOOLS

From a Dece~~er 1976 survey by the Association for Intercollegiate
Athletics for Women of the number of its member schools offering
intercollegiate competition for women.
Reprinted from: Y..adzielski, Mark A. "Postsecondary Athletics in an era of'
Equality: An Appraisal of the Effect of' Title IX." 5 Journal of Colle~e
and U~iversity Law (1979). pp 132-133. See 45 C.F.R. Part 86, Sect. 8 .41.
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*SCHOOLS

WOMEN'S ATHLETICS

l.mN'S ATHLEriCS

WOMEN'S % OF TOTAL

Indiana

$2l8,000

$3,500,000

5.86%

Iow-a

$250,000

$2,000,000

ll.ll%

Michigan

$l80,000

$5,000,000

3.47%

Michigan State

$256,000

$4,500,000

5.38%

Hinnesota

$4oo,ooo

$3,400,000

l0.53%

Ohio State

$300,000

$5,700,000

5. oc:f1/o

Wisconsin

$209,000

$2,2l7,000

8.62%

Average

$259,000

$3,759,7l4

7.l4%

*Figures unavailable for Illinois, Purdue, and .North1vestern. Budgets listed
may not include the total money spent since some salaries and administrative
costs may be reflected·in other budgets.

Reprinted from: Kadzielski, Mark A. "Postsecondary Athletics in an era of
Equality: An Appraisal of the Effect of Title IX." 5 Journal of College and
University Law (l979). pp l32-l33. See 45 C.F.R. Part 86, Sect. 86.4l.
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Inconsistent Judicial Interpretations of Title IX
1.

Cape v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n., 424 F. Supp.
732 (1976), revised per cuffiam F. 2d 793 (6th Cir. 1977).
Female high school basketball player

claimed that six-player,

half-court basketball rules denied her full benefits of the game and prevented her from obtaining a college athletic scholarship.

Contended that

this vms in violation of equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment.
Also claimed right to relief under Title IX.

District court ruled in favor

of girl although not interpreting Title IX as granting a private right of
action.

However, 6th Circuit Court reversed the lower court's decision to

strike the rules as being a deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment right.
2.

Jones v. Secondary School Activities Ass'n., 453, F. Supp. 150
(W.D. Okla. 1977).
Same issue as Cape.

Court dismissed those portions dealing

with Title IX on the grounds that plaintiff had not exhausted all adndnistrati ·.re remedies. · Likeui:::e, ruled that six-player rules do not constitute equal
protection U.eprivation of the Fourteenth Amendment. ·

3.

Aiken v. UniYer3ity of Oregon, 39 OR. App. 779 (1979).
Parents of members of 110men 's basketball team claimed University

cf Oregon's intercollegiate athletic department ·.riolated Title IX
reso.rd to :mequal:

transportation, officiating, coaching, and eorr.mitment

on behn.lf ::lf the u.r1iverdty.
i~stitution

!~.

~effel

,n. th

Court ruled thn.t all programs i·Tithin the

are subject to Title IX regulations.
..,, . :·!j.sco:1sin

:nte~scholantic

. it:1l~~ic A3s

'~.,

J,!;l; ? • 8upp.

-----------,
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F~r.!ale

high school hase'baJ_l p2.ayer claimc.:i that rule prohioi t-

ing girls ti1e opportunity to play :::ontact sports in mixed competition :_s contrar:,r t':' P.qt;.al
ir~terp:retatio:ts

_i?T':)t~ction

clause of Fourteenth An:endn:cnt.

instit1~ti::ms

of Title IX, 'vhich perr!lits eG.ucaticnal

excluding sirls and 1mme:1

f1·c~

l-llU' s policy

can tact SIJorts, ;·raG also contended.

fr'J:n
Co'..~=+;

ruled in favor of the girl st::..ting +;hat congressional er:.::.ctr:::2:1ts ce.r:not
preerr:pt constitutional provisi::ms.

:=;.

lhticmal C::~-~e;::.ate At:.uet:.c Ass':-1. v. Ca}_-i-"'a!D, 1~~~.;. :-. Sc'-.i?P·
425 (1978), reyised 622 ::". 2d 13F:2 (1)8C).
':'he NCAA instituted declaratory and-injunctive relief in an

attempt to invalidate the 1-<::E.'l regulations vThich include intercollegiate
athleti~s

vdthin the purvievT of Title IX.

HCAl\. lacked standing to sue.

District court ruled that the

Appeals court reverned, and sent the case

back to the Kansas City district court where litigation is pending.
6.

Hutchins v. Board of Trustees of Ivlichie;an State University,

C.A. No. G 79-87 (1979).
\·lomen 's basketball team :Oiled complaint that university violated
Title IX's sex discrimination prohibitions by giving the men's 1::-asketball
tea~ ~ore

money for travelling, better facilities, etc.

is pending, the court issued a

tempor~J

Although litigation

restraining order barring Michigan

State from giving its men's teams better treatment than its women's teams.

7.

Dodson v. Arkansas Act~vities Ass'n.,

468

F. Supp.

394 (1979).

?emale basketball player sought an injunction to stop the hie;h
school ansociation from ioposing the six-player rules in games.
she

~von

the case or. Fourteenth Amendment g!'Ounds,

~he

Alth0ugh

court used a program-

l
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interpretation
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Title IX thereby throwing out the Title IX

contention since the programs and activities concerned in this case
Nere not the beneficiaries of federal financial assistance.
8.

~

v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp.

659 (1979).
Different type

o~

Title IX litigation as a male athlete

sought injunctive relief against the school district to allow him to
play on an all-girls' volleyball team since there was no boys' volleyball
team.

The court ruled in favor

o~

the boy, thus interpreting HEW's reg-

ulations, which prohibit the disallowing

o~

members of bne sex from partie-

ipating with members of the other sex when there is no team for the excluded
sex, as working in favor

9-

o~

either sex.

-Othen v. Ann Arbor School Board, 507 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981)..
Female high school student sought a

pe~anent

hibiting sex discrimination on the school's golf team.

injunction pro-

Although the district

court acknovrledged the need to provide -vmmen with an equal opportunity in all
aspects

o~

life, including athletics, it ruled against the female athlete.

The court held that the HEW regulati0ns

ad~pted

under Title IX were invalid

since they contained an institutional application of this legislation, when
its original language required only a program-specific application.

10.

Be~~ett

v. West Texas State University, 527, F. Supp. 77 (N.D.

Tex. 198i).
Six female students who participated in the university's
intercollegiate athletic program sued the school

~or

alleged discriminatory

policies and practices which are prohibited by Title IX.

University officials
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claimed that since the athletic department did not directly receive
federal fUnds, the athletic program was outside the scope of Title IX.
The district court issued a program-specific ruling in favor of the
university.
11.

HQ.ff'er v. Temple University, 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
Similar to Bennett, as women at Temple claimed the university's

athletic department was in violation of Title IX.· Likewise, the university
argued that its athletic program should not be required to comply with
Title IX regulations since intercollegiate athletics are not directly
assisted by federal funds.

However, this district court gave an institutional

interpretation of Title IX thus ruling in favor of the women.
12.

North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 102

s.

Ct. 1927 (1982).

This case did not involve intercollegiate athletics, per se, but
it did deal with Title IX.

The

u.s.

Supreme

Co~t

ruled that Title IX pro-

hibits sex discrimination in educational institutions receiving federal
assistance and is applicable to employees as well as students.

However,

it did not specifically address the question of whether Title IX covers all
programs at an institution receiving federal assistance, or only those
programs directly assisted.
13.

University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321 (G.D. Va. 1982).
It had been reported to the Department of Education (DOE) that

the university was in violation of Title IX regulations.

The university sought

injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent DOE from investigating its intercollegiate athletic program since it did not

~eceive

direct aid.

The court
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interpreted North Haven to be program-specific and thereby ruled in favor
of the university.
14.

Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F. 2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982).
Private coeducational institution which receives no federal

assistance other than aid to its students filed suit seeking an order to
declare void the DOE's termination of student financial assistance based
on the institution's failure to comply with Title IX.

The appeals court

reversed the district court's decision, ruling that North Haven should be
interpreted institutionally thereby stating that Title IX's regulations are
not limited to those programs 1rhich receive direct federal assistance.
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